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I. INTRODUCTION
The circuit courts of Florida have been authorized to render declara-
tory judgments and decrees in certain cases since 1919.1 Declaratory
judgment statutes were designed to fill a need for protection of legal
interests, public and private, which courts were otherwise unable or
unwilling to protect. The original Florida statute, passed before the Uni-
form Declaratory Judgments Act was drafted, was narrowly drawn. How-
ever, the scope of the remedy has gradually been enlarged through addi-
tional legislation, so that today the courts are at least empowered to protect
any substantial legal interest placed in jeopardy.2 The fact remains, how-
ever, that the remedial purposes intended by the several legislatures which
adopted these statutes have not yet been fully achieved.
More than fifty years after the first declaratory judgment statute
became effective, the status of the declaratory remedy in Florida is
still far from clear, and its usefulness has been correspondingly impaired.
Florida courts have said that these statutes are to be liberally and hos-
pitably construed, but some decisions belie these affirmations. Further-
more, contradictory statements as to the fundamentals of jurisdiction
* Professor of Law, Stetson University College of Law. The author gratefully ac-
knowledges the research assistance of James R. Case (J.D. 1972) and Keith M. Casto (J.D.
1973).
1. For current legislation see FLA. STAT. §§ 86.011-.111 (1971). For a discussion of
prior legislation, see text at notes 11-34 infra.
2. Perhaps the most striking social gain of the declaratory action is the widening
of the scope of the economic interests-including immunity and release from obliga-
tions or claims-now taken under judicial protection, interests which were hereto-
fore left outside judicial cognizance.
Preface to E. BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS at x (2d ed. 1941) [hereinafter cited as
BORcARDI].
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persist. To this day, the language of the opinions leaves unclear whether
an "actual controversy" is required in order to obtain a declaratory judg-
ment. In addition, courts have not always taken note of the important
changes made in declaratory judgment law by new legislative and judi-
cial developments; old cases, decided under narrower statutes or aban-
doned judicial concepts, are sometimes still cited as authoritative.
There has been no recent general attempt, either in legal journals or in
judicial opinions, to resolve the contradictions and clarify the ambiguities.'
The adoption of the new judicial article to the state constitution, effective
January 1, 1973, 4 makes appropriate a reexamination of the judicial power
to afford declaratory relief, since declaratory cases sometimes strain
that power to its utmost limits. New kinds of legislation and litiga-
tion, such as environmental statutes and public interest suits in that field,
should, if possible, be integrated into the traditional body of the law. In
light of these considerations, a review of Florida declaratory judgment
law which seeks to identify what is obsolete or inharmonious and explains
the rest is desirable. That is the purpose of this article.
This article will examine the constitutional, statutory, and judge-
made requirements for invoking the jurisdiction of Florida courts in
declaratory judgment cases. Since the requirements are sometimes cast in
terms of judicial power or jurisdiction, and sometimes in terms of judicial
discretion, both will be discussed. No attempt will be made to deal with the
"practice" or "procedure" aspects of the subject.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE DECLARATORY REMEDY
The fundamental difference between the conventional cause of action
and the declaratory cause of action is the absence of a prayer for coercive
relief in the latter. Every civil complaint necessarily seeks a declaration
of the plaintiff's rights, if no more than a finding that he is entitled to a
money judgment. The conventional complaint also asks the court to
order the defendant to pay money, or to take other action to satisfy
plaintiff's claim. The declaratory complaint, in its pure form, requests
only a judicial declaration.
If plaintiff is entitled to coercive relief, he will normally ask for it
rather than rest contentedly with only a prayer for a declaration. There-
fore, the need for the declaratory remedy usually arises when plaintiff is
not entitled to ask the court for coercive relief. Plaintiff may be debarred
from such relief in a number of familiar legal situations. For example, he
may seek to establish his status, such as heirship or legal competency;
determine the title to, or an interest in, real or personal property; have a
will or other written instrument construed, as a guide to his future action
3. The last general discussion was contained in McCarthy, Declaratory Judgments, 3
MIAw L.Q. 365 (1949).
4. FLA. CONST. art. V.
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or inaction; obtain instructions for himself as trustee concerning the ad-
ministration of the trust; have bonds issued by plaintiff as a public au-
thority validated; or interplead claimants to a fund in which plaintiff
claims no interest. Most of these declaratory causes of action were enter-
tained, even in the absence of a statute, both at law and in equity. Others
have been authorized by special legislation, such as the Florida act per-
mitting the circuit courts to declare the validity of government bonds, and
the taxes levied for payment thereof.5
However, judge-made law and special legislation failed to protect
many legal interests placed in jeopardy but not yet actually injured by
any act of the potential defendant. In the first place, these traditional
declaratory remedies were confined to special types of subject matter,
leaving claimants of many other rights, privileges and franchises without
legal relief. Secondly, the traditional remedies failed to protect a large
class of persons interested in establishing the nonexistence of rights or
claims against themselves. Important legal interests were often sacrificed
because of the inability to obtain such negative declarations. A con-
spicuous example was the decision in Willing v. Chicago Auditorium
Association,6 which led to the enactment of the Federal Declaratory Judg-
ments Act. In Willing, the holder of a long-term lease on Chicago prop-
erty desired to raze the existing building and erect a new one, which he
anticipated would be more profitable. He believed that he had the right to
do so under the lease, but the matter was not free from doubt. The lessor
refused to give his consent, and the lease was subject to forfeiture if the
lessee razed the building without authority. The United States Supreme
Court held that the lessee had no cause of action to establish his right to
take the desired action. Unwilling to assume the risk of substantial
damages and forfeiture of the lease if his interpretation of the lease was
mistaken, the lessee abandoned his plan.
It is true that, in some of these cases, an injunction could be obtained
forbidding interference by defendant with plaintiff's action or status. The
United States Supreme Court has pointed out that the only difference
between a suit for declaration and one for injunction is the absence in the
declaratory complaint of allegations of irreparable injury and of a prayer
for coercive relief.7 Nevertheless, a further practical difference exsits.
Where a plaintiff's interests are in jeopardy, but defendant has not actually
threatened them, it may be difficult to prove danger of irreparable injury,
and an equity court will be reluctant to take the drastic step of granting
an injunction.' A two-stage procedure, in which the court first declares
plaintiff's rights and then, if defendant disregards the declaration, con-
5. Declaratory judgments validating bonds are authorized by FLA. STAT. §§ 75.01-.17
(1971). Other special declaratory judgment statutes are cited at notes 36, 38 and 102-06
infra. BORCHARD, supra note 2, at 137-39 discusses the non-statutory causes of action.
6. 277 U.S. 274 (1928) [hereinafter cited as Willing].
7. Nashdlle, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249 (1933).
8. J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1350 (4th ed. 1919).
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siders whether an injunction or other supplemental relief should be
granted, is easier to justify and, therefore, provides a superior protection
to the plaintiff. Yet, as the Willing case shows, the courts often believed
themselves unauthorized to follow this procedure.
The injustices suffered in the absence of any declaratory remedy
led to much agitation among legal scholars for broad enactments au-
thorizing declaratory judgments, regardless of both subject matter and
of whether the relief sought was positive or negative. Professor Edwin
Borchard became one of the leaders in that endeavor, and his authorita-
tive Declaratory Judgments sums up the history of the movement.'
Michigan enacted the first general statute in 1919. l ° Florida's first
statute, enacted the same year, was much more limited in scope, con-
fining the power to render declaratory judgments to the construction of
specified written instruments." The question of the constitutionality of
the Florida legislation did not reach the Supreme Court of Florida until
1930, when the act was sustained in Sheldon v. Powell.12 Since that case
has frequently been cited and relied upon to the present day, a discus-
sion of its background and rationale are important to an understanding
of the history of declaratory judgments in Florida and of the present
power of the courts to render such judgments.
In the years between the enactment of the Florida statute in 1919
and the Sheldon opinion in 1930, important decisions in declaratory cases
were handed down in Michigan and by the United States Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court of Florida felt obligated to distinguish these cases
in order to sustain its own statute. In Anway v. Grand Rapids Railway,"
the Supreme Court of Michigan had held the broad statute of that state
unconstitutional on the ground that the legislation imposed on the courts
"non-judicial" functions; 'it allegedly authorized an "advisory opinion"
in a case where plaintiff and defendant agreed that plaintiff was entitled
to relief.'4 The Florida court cited, but refused to follow the Michigan
case, on the ground that the Florida statute did not authorize courts to
9. BORCHARD, supra note 2 at 132-36.
10. Law of May 2, 1919, No. 150, [1919] Pub. Acts Mich. 278-79 (repealed 1929).
11. Section 1. [A]ny person or corporation claiming to be interested under a deed,
will, contract in writing, or other instrument in writing, may apply by Bill in
Chancery to any Court in this State having equity jurisdiction for the determination
of any question of construction arising under the instrument and for a declaration
of the rights of the person or corporation interested, whether or not further
relief is or could be claimed, and such declaration shall have the force of a final
decree in chancery.
Sec. 2. [A]ll proceedings instituted under the provisions of [the preceding
section] shall be in conformity with the law and rules of court governing other
proceedings in Chancery, as far as the same may be applicable....
Law of June 9, 1919, ch. 7857, §§ 1-2 [1919] Fla. Laws 148 (repealed 1943).
12. 99 Fla. 782, 128 So. 258 (1930) [hereinafter cited as Sheldon].
13. 211 Mich. 592, 179 N.W. 350 (1920).
14. The defendant admitted the allegations of the bill of complaint. Id. at 593, 179
N.W. at 351. Although neither party questioned the validity of the statute, the court on
its own motion held the statute unconstitutional. Id. at 597, 179 N.W. at 361.
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give such "advisory opinions," and, therefore, confined the court to "judi-
cial" functions, as required by the Florida Constitution." The question
remained whether this "judicial" functions requirement implied that
Florida courts could only decide "cases" and "controversies." The United
States Supreme Court had recently interpreted these terms, as used in
Article III of the federal Constitution, as excluding declaratory judg-
ment actions."0 The Supreme Court of Florida distinguished the United
States Supreme Court cases by noting the absence of a "cases" and "con-
troversies" requirement in the Florida Constitution. 7 The court then
sustained the Florida Declaratory Judgments Act of 1919.
Thus, the Court in Sheldon decided two things: First, that the Flor-
ida courts were forbidden to render "advisory opinions," because to do
so would be a "non-judicial" function and would violate the state consti-
tution. Second, that this prohibition did not imply that Florida courts
were limited to deciding "cases" and "controversies," as those terms had
been defined by the United States Supreme Court (so as to exclude de-
claratory judgments). The court's opinion, delivered in 1930, did not and
could not anticipate that in 1937 the United States Supreme Court would
reinterpret the terms "cases" and "controversies" to include declaratory
judgments,"8 thereby sustaining the validity of the Federal Declaratory
Judgments Act of 1934.19 The Sheldon decision, therefore, does not au-
thorize the conclusion that the "judicial" functions limitation of the state
constitution authorizes court action outside the scope of "cases" and "con-
troversies" as those terms were subsequently more broadly interpreted by
the United States Supreme Court.
Obviously it would be desirable for the Supreme Court of Florida to
reexamine the "judicial powers" limitation on the state courts, especially
since subsequent statutes have greatly expanded the declaratory remedy,
and the same "judicial powers" limitation has been carried forward to the
new constitution, effective in 1973.20 Thus far, the Court has not done so.
15. Sheldon v. Powell, 99 Fla. 782, 792, 128 So. 258, 262 (1930). The case was decided
on April 8, 1930. Neither the court nor the counsel apparently knew of the case of Wash-
ington-Detroit Theater Co. v. Moore, 249 Mich. 673, 229 N.W. 618 (1930), decided March
6, 1930, which sustained the new Michigan declaratory judgment statute of 1929. Law of
Aug. 28, 1929, No. 36, [1929] Pub. Acts Mich. 68-69 (repealed 1961). That statute was ex-
pressly made applicable on]y to "cases of actual controversy." Id. §1.
16. Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Grannis, 273 U.S. 70 (1927), and Willing v. Chicago
Auditorium Ass'n, 277 U.S. 274 (1928), construing U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, which limits
the judicial power of the United States to "cases" and "controversies."
17. Sheldon v. Powell, 99 Fla. 782, 788, 128 So. 258, 261 (1930).
18. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937) (district court had jurisdiction
to declare whether plaintiff insurance company had to keep a policy in force because of
insured's alleged total and permanent disability).
19. Act of June 14, 1934, ch. 512, 48 Stat. 955, as amended, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02
(1970>. "In a case of actual controversy . . . any court of the United States . . .may
declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party. . . ." Id. § 2201.
20. "The judicial power shall be vested in a supreme court, district courts of appeal,
circuit courts and county courts." FLA. CONST. art. V, § 1. The provision of FLA. CONST.
art. V, § 11 (1885) giving the circuit courts jurisdiction of "such other matters as the
19721
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Instead, two lines of cases involving declaratory judgments have emerged,
one citing Sheldon to the effect that the "judicial powers" extend beyond
"cases" and "controversies, ' 2 ' and the other declaring that a "contro-
versy" must be present in all declaratory judgment cases.22 The result-
ing confusion has been carried forward into Florida legal texts.2
However, this apparent contradiction in Florida decisions disappears
when we look at the questions actually decided in the cases. Aside from
the constitutional exceptions for legislative apportionment and advisory
24opinions to the governor, no case has been found in which jurisdiction
to issue a declaration has been sustained by the Florida appellate courts
without the presence of a "controversy," in the present federal sense of
that term.2 5 Thus, the recent cases interpreting both the Florida Constitu-
tion and the current Florida Declaratory Judgments Act as requiring a
"controversy" in declaratory cases appear to correctly state the law.2"
The authority to issue declaratory judgments, first granted to Flor-
ida courts in 1919, has been broadened by subsequent enactments so that
today the statutory jurisdiction extends close to the limits of constitu-
tional power. Only the most important of these developments will be
noted at this point.27
The Declaratory Judgments Act of 194328 was based on the Uni-
legislature may provide," has been omitted, presumably because the supreme court held
that it could have reference only to "judicial matters or functions." Sheldon v. Powell, 99
Fla. 782, 792, 128 So. 258, 262 (1930).
21. Rosenhouse v. 1950 Spring Term Grand Jury, 56 So.2d 445 (Fla. 1952); Ready v.
Safeway Rock Co., 157 Fla. 27, 24 So.2d 808 (1946); Sample v. Ward, 156 Fla. 210, 23
So.2d 81 (1945).
22. North Shore Bank v. Town of Surfside, 72 So.2d 659 (Fla. 1954) ; Bryant v. Gray,
70 So.2d 581 (Fla. 1954); Ervin v. Taylor, 66 So.2d 816 (Fla. 1953); May v. Holley, 59
So.2d 636 (Fla. 1952); Hialeah Race Course, Inc. v. Gulfstream Park Racing Ass'n, 210
So.2d 750 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968).
23. It is settled as a general rule of law that the judicial power of courts can be
exercised only in determining actual controversies . . . . In fact, an "actual con-
troversy" is not necessary in declaratory judgment suits. It is clearly established,
however, that there must be a bona fide dispute between the contending parties
as to a present justicable question ....
The test to activate jurisdiction under the act is whether or not the moving
party shows that he is in doubt as to the existence or nonexistence of some right,
status, immunity, power or privilege, and that he is entitled to have such doubt
removed.
9A FLA. JuR. Declaratory Actions § 13 (1972 rev.).
In another text the decisions holding that there is no necessity for a controversy are de-
scribed as "incorrect," but are elsewhere cited as authoritative. THE FLORIDA BAR, CIVIL
PRACTICE BEFORE TRIAL, § 22 (2d ed. 1969).
24. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 16; art. IV, § 1.
25. A detailed examination of the present federal meaning of "controversy" is contained
in Dickson, Declaratory Remedies and Constitutional Change, 24 V~AD. L. Rlv. 257 (1971).
26. The elements of a "controversy," as set forth in Florida decisions, are discussed in
Section III infra.
27. Further analysis of the Florida statutes is contained in Sections III, A (legal nature
of the issues); III, B (ripeness of the case); III, C (adversary character of the proceed-
ing); and III, D (finality of the judgment to be rendered).
28. FLA. STAT. §§ 87.01-.13 (1949), as amended FLA. STAT, §§ 86.011-.111 (1971) [here-
inafter cited as "the 1943 Act" or as "the Florida Declaratory Judgments Act"].
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form Declaratory Judgments Act,29 with some significant changes which
broadened the scope of the Uniform Act. These were: a more compre-
hensive description of the subject matters upon which declarations could
be issued; more specific authority to issue negative as well as affirmative
declarations; a clear grant of power to declare facts or law existing at the
time of judgment or arising in the future; and authority to sue to resolve
doubts, as well as to establish rights, under instruments in writing.8"
While these changes would probably have raised constitutional questions
of justicability under earlier decisions, the cases since 1943 have gen-
erally assumed the validity of the 1943 Act.8 The statutory language
permits the courts to go about as far as the "judicial powers" limitation of
the constitution will permit.32
The 1955 amendments to the 1943 Act were only technical in nature,
intended to make it conform to the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, and
need not be noticed here." In 1967, the 1943 Act, as amended, under-
went primarily technical amendments again. 4 The broad coverage of the
1943 Act was left undisturbed.
The power to render declaratory judgments with reference to speci-
fied subject matters is also granted by other sections of the Florida Stat-
utes. The Bond Validation Act authorizes the circuit courts, upon peti-
tion of any political division of the state, to declare the authority of such
subdivision to incur debt, and the legality of all proceedings in connec-
tion therewith, including the levy of taxes.35 The Administrative Proce-
dure Act86 authorizes the circuit courts to issue declarations concerning
the validity or interpretation of any rule promulgated by a state agency.
Case law permits declaratory proceedings to review agency orders entered
29. UNIFORM DECLARATORY JUDGEMENTS ACT [hereinafter cited as "the Uniform Act"],
reported in McCarthy, Declaratory Judgments, 3 MIAmI L.Q. 365, 366 (1949).
30. Compare FLA. STAT. §§ 87.01-.04 (1949), as amended FLA. STAT. §§ 86.011-.041
(1971), with UNIFORm DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS ACT §§ 1-4.
31. The only case expressly dealing with the constitutionality of the 1943 Act is Fraser
v. Cohen, 159 Fla. 253, 31 So.2d 463 (1947), which held that the act did not unconstitu-
tionally abolish the distinction between law and equity. A suit for declaratory relief may
be filed either in equity or at law, depending on the subject matter. Caballero, Herdegen &
Knight, Inc. v. Threlkeld, 142 So.2d 124 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
32. The statement in deMarigny v. deMarigny, 43 So.2d 442 (Fla. 1949), that a prior
court decree cannot be construed by declaratory decree because decrees are not included in
the section 2 enumeration of "deed, will, contract or other article, memorandum or instru-
ment in writing" appears inconsistent with the language of the act and with other decisions
construing prior decrees. See text at note 120 infra.
33. Law of May 31, 1955, ch. 29738, § 2, [1955] Fla. Laws 157, amending FLA. STAT.
§§ 87.01-.13 (1955) (codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 87.01-.13 (1955)). The current codification
appears at FLA. STAT. §§ 86.01i-.111 (1971).
34. Fla. Laws 1967, ch. 67-254, § 38, amending FLA. STAT. §§ 87.01-.13 (1965) (codified
at FLA. STAT. §§ 86.011-.111 (1967)). The current codification appears at FLA. STAT. §§
86.011-.111 (1971).
35. FLA. STAT. §§ 75.01-.17 (1971).
36. FLA. STAT. § 120.30 (1971).
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without a due process hearing.37 There are additional special statutory
authorizations for declaratory judgments.38
It is apparent from the foregoing brief discussion that the practi-
tioner should bear in mind two major points in considering constitutional
jurisdiction to render declaratory judgments. (1) The extent of constitu-
tional restrictions in this field has not been authoritatively determined.
Sheldon, and the cases which followed it, relied on an obsolete federal
interpretation of "controversy," which is grossly misleading in light of
recent United States Supreme Court decisions.3 " (2) The broad language
of the statute and the inconsistent language in the decisions offer little
guidance. The restrictions on judicial power to issue declaratory judg-
ments must be gleaned from the results of the cases rather than from the
wording of the opinions. To this task we turn in the next section.
III. LIMITS ON DECLARATORY JURISDICTION
The old Florida Constitution, like the new one, vested in the courts
only "judicial power."' 0 In the Anglo-American system of justice, such
power can be invoked only when the subject matter before the court is of
a legal nature, involving concrete facts, in which opposing interests are
afforded an opportunity to be represented, and which is susceptible of
disposition by a final judgment or decree.4 ' A declaratory action which
meets these requirements is also a "controversy" in the present federal
sense.4" But whether or not one uses the term "controversy" in analyzing
the exercise of constitutional judicial power by the Florida courts is sim-
ply a question of terminology. In any event, the basic requirements are
the same. The opinions, in most Florida cases dealing with the subject,
affirmatively support this view. The decisions in all declaratory judgment
cases are consistent with it.
37. See text at notes 102 to 110 infra.
38. FLA. STAT. § 68.01 (1971) grants chancery courts jurisdiction to invalidate a tax
assessment at the suit of a taxpayer. FLA. STAT. § 479.08 (1971) authorizes declaratory
judgments concerning the validity of revocation of any sign permit, "as provided by chap-
ter 86."
39. Dickson, Declaratory Remedies and Constitutional Change, 24 VAMP. L. kav. 257,
272-75 (1971).
40. FLA. CONsT. art. V, § 1 (1885); FLA. CONST. art. V, § 1.
41. That the phrases, "cases of actual controversy" and "actual antagonistic as-
sertion and denial of right" are unnecessary is evidenced by the fact that the
statutes not containing these words, including the Uniform Act, have been held
constitutional in the states, on the assumption, inescapable in fact, that only such
cases could be appropriately presented for declaratory judgment. . . .Were the
controversy not genuine or ripe for judicial decision, with a plaintiff and de-
fendant having actually or potentially opposing interests, with a res or other legal
interest definitely affected by the judgment rendered and the judgment a final
determination of the issue, it would fail to present a justiciable dispute-not
because it seeks a declaratory judgment, but because it lacks the elements essential
to invoke any judgment from judicial courts.
BORCHARD, supra note 2 at 41-42.
42. See text at notes 18 & 19 supra.
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A brief review of the facts in those cases which asserted that
a "controversy" need not be present in order for judicial action to be
taken demonstrates that those cases did not so hold. Sheldon was a de-
claratory action brought by legatees under a will against the executor,
seeking to establish their rights to their legacies. Since the facts presented
a legal issue of a concrete nature, which the court had the power to deter-
mine and with the opposing interests of the legatees and the executor
represented, the case easily met the requirements stated above, and a
decree for complainants on the merits was affirmed. 43
Sample v. Ward41 was also a claim under a will, and jurisdiction was
likewise sustained. It is interesting to note that in Sample the supreme
court, while denying the necessity of an "actual controversy," went on
to say that
[i] f the question raised in such a suit is real and not theoretical,
the person raising it has a bona fide interest under the writing,
and there is a defender or defenders with a bona fide right to
defend, the court .. .will not be held in error in assumingjurisdiction and rendering a declaratory judgment. ... ."
Obviously, whatever the name that may be given to it, the court was
applying the "controversy" test.46
Ready v. Safeway Rock Co.4 1 involved a bill to construe a lease
from plaintiff's predecessor in title to defendant Safeway, in which the
question was whether the lease could be forfeited for defendant's failure
to erect a phosphate crushing plant of the capacity specified in the lease.
The court affirmed a decree on the merits for the defendant. The major-
ity's rejection of the term "controversy" to designate the issue before it
was disapproved of by Justice Brown, concurring specially. He said that
article V of the constitution conferred only judicial power, which required
an actual controversy, and that such a controversy was present in the
case.
48
Rosenhouse v. 1950 Spring Term Grand Jury49 held that plaintiff,
as a citizen and taxpayer of Dade County, was entitled to a hearing on
the merits of his declaratory action to construe a statute appropriating
public monies and defining the duties of public officials. An actual con-
troversy was present, provided that plaintiff had standing to sue. The
court's decision that plaintiff's interest was sufficient to give him stand-
ing supplied the last element necessary for a controversy, and the deci-
43. 99 Fla. 782, 128 So. 258 (Fla. 1930). See text at notes 12-19 supra.
44. 156 Fla. 210, 23 So.2d 81 (1945).
45. Id. at 215, 23 So.2d at 83.
46. See text at note 41 supra.
47. 157 Fla. 27, 24 So.2d 808 (1946).
48. Id. at 32, 24 So.2d at 810.
49. 56 So.2d 445 (Fla. 1952).
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sion is in line with cases in this state and elsewhere sustaining the power
of courts to entertain taxpayer's actions.5"
Significantly, there have been no recent opinions rejecting the use
of "controversy" to define the prerequisites for the exercise of judicial
power. In fact, for a number of years, opinions in declaratory cases have
expressly adopted the term. May v. Holley51 was a suit by a landowner
for a declaration that he had the right to raze defendant's building to
the extent that it encroached on his land. The Supreme Court of Florida
reversed the trial court's dismissal of the complaint and stated as follows:
Before any proceeding for declaratory relief should be en-
tertained it should be clearly made to appear that there is a
bona fide, actual, present practical need for the declaration;
that the declaration should deal with a present, ascertained or
ascertainable state of facts or present controversy as to a state
of facts; that some immunity, power, privilege or right of the
complaining party is dependent upon the facts or the law ap-
plicable to the facts; that there is some person or persons who
have or reasonably may have an actual, present, adverse or an-
tagonistic interest in the subject matter, either in fact or law;
that the antagonistic and adverse interest [sic] are all before
the court by proper process or class representation and that the
relief sought is not merely the giving of legal advice by the
courts or the answer to questions propounded from curiosity.
These elements are necessary in order to maintain the status of
the proceeding as being judicial in nature and therefore within
the constitutional power of the courts.52
In the recent declaratory action of Hialeak Race Course, Inc. v.
Gulfstream Park Racing Association, the District Court of Appeal,
Fourth District, used substantially the same language in affirming the
circuit court's refusal to dismiss a declaratory complaint, asserting that
"[t]here must be a bona fide controversy."53 In several cases where the
court has found an essential element of a "controversy" missing in a de-
claratory action, the declaration has been refused.54
There is no material difference between the elements of a justiciable
"controversy," as defined by the Supreme Court of Florida in Holley,
and the formulations of courts in other jurisdictions and of text writers.55
50. See text at notes 111-14 and 182-86 infra.
51. 59 So.2d 636 (Fla. 1952) [hereinafter cited as Holley].
52. Id. at 639.
53. 210 So.2d 750, 752 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968). A decree for plaintiff on the merits was
later affirmed on direct appeal without discussion of this point. Hialeah Race Course, Inc.
v. Gulfstream Park Racing Ass'n, 245 So.2d 625 (Fla. 1971).
54. North Shore Bank v. Town of Surfside, 72 So.2d 659 (Fla. 1954) (case hypothet-
ical); Bryant v. Gray, 70 So.2d 581 (Fla. 1954) (case hypothetical); Ervin v. Taylor, 66
So.2d 816 (Fla. 1953) (no adverse parties); Village of Virginia Gardens v. City of Miami
Springs, 171 So.2d 199 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965) (insufficient facts and no doubt alleged).
55. "The controversy must be definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of
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A justiciable "controversy," whether in a state or the federal system, con-
sists of: (1) a "legal" issue or issues, such as the existence or nonexist-
ence of some immunity, power, privilege or right; (2) which is ripe for
judicial decision, i.e., a present controversy; (3) on which adverse posi-
tions are represented by parties possessing sufficient interest in the sub-
ject matter; and (4) susceptible of a judgment finally disposing of the
issues, i.e., not involving the giving of legal advice on issues which are
moot or beyond the power of courts to resolve.
We shall consider each of these requirements in turn, as they have
been formulated by the legislature and applied by the Florida courts in
declaratory judgment cases.
A. Legal Nature of the Issues
The first criterion for the justiciability of a dispute is that it be
"legal" in nature. If the dispute involves an area over which the public
authority has asserted control, the problem of justiciability becomes a
problem of separation of powers. The jurisdictional question ordinarily
presented to the court is: Whether, by hearing and deciding the case, the
court will be intruding on matters reserved to the exclusive discretion of
the legislature or the executive? If so, the question is not "legal," but
"political," and the acts of the legislature or executive are not subject
to judicial review."6 A fortiori, they are not subject to declaratory judg-
ment.
The boundary between "political" and "legal" questions has been
shifting rapidly in recent years. One of the most striking examples of this
change involves the apportionment of legislative districts. In 1946 the
United States Supreme Court declared that the judicial branch "ought
not to enter this political thicket."57 The Court thereafter not only en-
tered the thicket, but made itself at home there. It struck down appor-
tionment plans containing variations in district population of less than
four percent from "the mathematical ideal" of absolute equality."8 Un-
der the compulsion of these decisions, the amended Florida constitution
requires the Supreme Court of Florida to determine by declaratory judg-
ment the validity of each decennial reapportionment of the legislature,
or draft the apportionment plan itself if the legislature fails to do so."
No guidelines whatever are contained in the state constitution to aid the
parties having adverse legal interests. . . . It must be a real and substantial controversy
admitting of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character. . . ." Aetna Life Ins.
Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240-41 (1937) (emphasis added). Accord, Abbott v. Parker,
249 So.2d 908 (La. 1971); BORCHAR, supra note 2 at 195-203.
56. 6A J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE ff 57.14, at 3079 (2d ed. 1966).
57. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946).
58. Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969); Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542
(1969).
59. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 16. See In re Apportionment Law, 263 So.2d 797 (Fla. 1972).
1972 ]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXVII
court in finding its way through the "political thicket" that has now be-
come a "legal thicket."
Another issue traditionally classified as "non-judicial" was the rev-
ocation of a license or benefit which the legislature and the executive
(either directly or through a licensing agency) need not have granted in
the first place. Liquor licenses were the most conspicuous of these. Un-
der the so-called "doctrine of privilege," the majority of state courts
held that, since the state could entirely forbid all sale of liquor, a license
for the sale of liquor was granted subject to an arbitrary right of with-
drawal, or (what amounted to the same thing) a withdrawal based on
charges which need not be proved in a fair hearing.6" The view that, be-
cause the original grant of the license or benefit was a "privilege" be-
stowed on the citizen, and not a right, the withdrawal could be arbitrary,
has now been decisively repudiated by the United States Supreme Court.6'
It has also been repudiated by the Supreme Court of Florida in a case
arising under the Beverage Control Law, which held that premises could
not be "padlocked" against the sale of liquor without a hearing satisfy-
ing the requirements of due process.6 2 These decisions mean that, while
there is no "right" to retain a "privilege," there is a "right" to the ele-
ments of a due process hearing before the government withdraws a "priv-
ilege" and, thereby, destroys a livelihood or other property. There are
other issues no longer considered "political," but suffice it to say that
the number of subjects on which the Florida courts are empowered to
declare cannot any longer be narrowly circumscribed.
The present Florida Declaratory Judgments Act is essentially the
statute adopted in 1943, since the subsequent amendments were only
technical in nature. That statute grants not only all the powers proposed
in the Uniform Act, but manifests a legislative intent to grant additional
powers. Therefore, it may safely be stated that, in any given case, the
Florida courts possess at least the powers granted by the Uniform Act,
and may have other powers in addition.
The Florida act grants to the circuit courts of this state the follow-
ing jurisdiction:
(1) The court has jurisdiction to declare "rights, status and other
equitable or legal relations," and the "existence, or nonexistence . ..
[o]f any immunity, power, privilege or right; or... [o]f any fact upon
which the existence or nonexistence of such immunity, power, privilege
or right does or may depend ... ."I' Only the first quoted clause appears,
60. E.g., Walker v. City of Clinton, 244 Iowa 1099, 59 N.W.2d 785 (1953). Compare
K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 175-89 (3d ed. 1972).
61. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (procedural due process requires that a
pre-termination evidentiary hearing be held for recipients of welfare benefits); Willner v.
Committee on Character and Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963) (denial of application to bar
without hearing on charges against applicant is denial of procedural due process).
62. Keating v. State, 173 So.2d 673 (Fla. 1965).
63. FLA. STAT. § 86.011 (1971).
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in slightly different form, in the Uniform Act.64 By virtue of the second
quoted clause, the Florida Legislature has emphasized that the courts
are authorized to protect any legal interest, a "privilege" as well as a
"right," and that they may adjudge contested issues of "fact" as well as
of "law" in so doing.
(2) "The court's declaration may be either affirmative or negative
in form and effect .... 165 The Uniform Act is substantially similar."
Thus, the court may declare the nonexistence of any right, status, power,
privilege or other equitable or legal relation claimed by either plaintiff
or defendant which is asserted against a "privilege," "immunity" or
"power" of the other party.
(3) Out of an abundance of caution, in case the above enumerations
should be insufficient to encompass the full range of powers intended to
be granted, other sections of the act provide that the plaintiff may obtain
a declaration of rights under "a deed, will, contract or other instrument
in writing," as well as "a statute," "any regulation made under statutory
authority," or a "municipal ordinance."67 It is further provided that a
contract may be construed either before or after breach;" that declara-
tions may be rendered on all questions concerning estates or trusts, in-
cluding interests therein or claims against them;69 and that the foregoing
enumeration "does not limit or restrict the exercise of the general powers"
conferred by the first section.7° Aside from minor differences in termi-
nology, the corresponding sections of the Uniform Act are the same,
with one possibly significant exception; the Florida authorization for a
declaration concerning "any regulation made under statutory authority"
is not contained in the Uniform Act. Furthermore, the Florida Admin-
istrative Procedure Act, which applies to all state agencies unless spe-
cifically excepted, expressly authorizes circuit courts to make declara-
tions concerning the validity or interpretation of any rule issued by an
administrative agency.72 Thus, under Florida law, it is clear that the
whole field of administrative rules and regulations is open to declaratory
judgments, while there may be some doubt about the extent of that power
under the Uniform Act.73
64. "The Courts of Record within their respective jurisdictions shall have the power
to declare rights, status, and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could
be claimed." UNIFoRM DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS ACT § 1.
65. FLA. STAT. § 86.011 (1971).
66. "The declaration may be either affirmative or negative in form and effect." UNI-
FORM DECLARATORY JuDcMNENTs ACT § 1.
67. FLA. STAT. § 86.021 (1971).
68. FLA. STAT. § 86.031 (1971).
69. FLA. STAT. § 86.041 (1971).
70. FLA. STAT. § 86.051 (1971).
71. UNiFoRM DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS ACT §§ 2-5.
72. FLA. STAT. § 120.30 (1971).
73. Case law under the Uniform Act upholds the power of courts to issue declarations
with reference to the validity or interpretation of administrative rules. See e.g., Gibbs v.
Cochran, 281 Ala. 22, 198 So.2d 607 (1967); King v. Priest, 357 Mo. 68, 206 S.W.2d 547
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The right of trial by jury, in the case of all issues so triable, is spe-
cifically preserved in declaratory proceedings.74 Thus, there is no attempt
to disturb the pre-existing division between law and equity. Since de-
claratory jurisdiction is granted by statute only to the circuit courts,
other courts do not possess such jurisdiction,75 and the circuit court itself
is without declaratory jurisdiction in cases where the amount claimed is
outside its jurisdictional limit.70
Under the Florida Declaratory Judgments Act, therefore, legal or
equitable declaratory actions may cover the full range of subjects of,
and proceed in the same manner as, the ordinary civil action, with only
basic distinctions which are inherent in the declaratory proceeding. First,
the declaratory cause of action involves the resolution of a doubt or the
removal of a peril, rather than redress for an injury already inflicted.
Second, since the relief prayed for is declaratory rather than coercive, a
cause of action is alleged and proved if plaintiff shows himself entitled
to the declaration, whether it be in his favor or in favor of the defendant.
The Florida cases reflect these distinctive characteristics of the declara-
tory action.
The first point appears in those cases which hold that in a de-
claratory action plaintiff need not allege that his legal theory or his ver-
sion of the facts has actually been challenged, but only that it is jeop-
ardized by a bona fide doubt as to whether his position or that of the
defendant's is correct. Thus, the courts have held complaints sufficient
where they alleged that the interpretation of a contract was doubtful; 77
that a tenant was in doubt as to a landlord's duty under the lease to make
repairs; 18 that the meaning of a stockholders' agreement, although clear
on its face, was doubtful due to extrinsic facts;7 ° or that there was doubt
as to the obligation to arbitrate a claim for a rate increase under a fran-
chise granted by the city to a waste collector."0 On the other hand, where
the complaint failed to show the existence of a bona fide doubt, the courts
have dismissed complaints asking for a declaration of rights under stat-
utes or ordinances, 8' or asking the court to construe a foreign divorce
decree which was admittedly clear and unambiguous.8 2
(1947), appeal dismissed 333 U.S. 852 (1948); Drink, Inc. v. Babcock, 77 N.M. 277, 421
P.2d 798 (1966); Frankenthal v. Wisconsin Real Estate Brokers' Bd., 3 Wis. 2d 249, 89
N.W.2d 825 (1958).
74. FLA. STAT. § 86.071 (1971); UNIFORM DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS ACT § 9.
75. In the Interest of My, 162 So.2d 551 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
76. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v Wallace, 209 So.2d 719 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
77. Jensen v. Dipaolo's Italian Foods Co., 244 So.2d 513 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970); Berko-
witz v. Firestone, 173 So.2d 161 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
78. Zero Food Storage, Inc. v. Henderson's Sea Food, Inc.. 121 So.2d 462 (Fla. 3d
Dist. 1960).
79. Bacon v. Crespi, 141 So.2d 823 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
80. Bell v. Associated Independents, Inc., 143 So.2d 904 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
81. Bullema v. Losey, 84 So.2d 715 (Fla. 1956); Dade County v. Rauzin, 81 So.2d 508
(Fla. 1955) ; Duplig v. City of South Daytona, 195 So.2d 581 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1967).
82. Colby v. Colby, 120 So.2d 797 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1960).
DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS
Since the greater includes the lesser, it would seem obvious that an
allegation that plaintiff's clear legal right has been threatened by the
defendant should be at least as good as an allegation that plaintiff's
doubtful right has been so threatened.s3 Yet, in a few instances, district
courts of appeal have held the positive allegations insufficient, presum-
ably on the theory that the more certain a plaintiff is that he is right, the
less entitled he is to relief.8 4 These cases are illogical and should be re-
pudiated.
The second point-that plaintiff need only show himself entitled to
the declaration, not necessarily prove that he is right, in order to with-
stand a motion to dismiss-is clearly supported by the decisions. Nu-
merous cases point out that in ordinary actions plaintiff must allege and
prove his right to the claimed coercive relief, but that in declaratory pro-
ceedings the test of a complaint is not whether plaintiff will get a de-
claration in accordance with his contention, but whether he is entitled
to a declaration at all. 5 If he is, the trial court is obligated to render a
declaration. A dismissal of the complaint without a declaration is incor-
rect even though the final result would have to be a judgment for defen-
dant on the merits. 6
Under both the Uniform Act and the Florida act, the subject mat-
ter of declaratory judgments may include all or substantially all of the
range of the civil and criminal law. Many cases illustrating this conclu-
sion have been collected in the works on this subject.8 While the Flor-
ida decisions have not yet been so all-encompassing, they do illustrate
the potentialities of this form of relief.
Since the adoption of the Florida Declaratory Judgments Act of
1919, authorizing declaratory judgments concerning written instruments,
83. "The cause of action is to be found in the petitioner's need for judicial relief and
this need exists whether he requires affirmative recognition of his own claim upon another
or whether he desires to be freed from the unfounded claim of another." BORCHARD, supra
note 2 at 927 (emphasis added).
84. Central Mut. Ins. Co. v. Espina, 208 So.2d 144 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968); Johnson v.
Atlantic Nat'l Ins. Co., 155 So.2d 886 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963), cert. denied 162 So.2d 665 (Fla.
1964); Lyles v. Dade County, 123 So.2d 466 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1960).
85. Modernage Furniture Co. v. Miami Rug Co., 84 So.2d 917 (Fla. 1955); Gates v.
City of Jacksonville, 278 So.2d 645 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973) ; Caswell v. Nethery, 258 So.2d 846
(Fla. 1st Dist. 1972); Talcott v. Central Bank & Trust Co., 220 So.2d 411 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1969); Heath v. Central Truck Lines, 195 So.2d 588 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1967); Kickliter v. Na-
tional Union Fire Ins. Co., 188 So.2d 872 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966); R-C-B-S Corp. v. City of
Atlantic Beach, 178 So.2d 906 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965) ; Hankins v. Title & Trust Co., 169 So.2d
526 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964).
86. Local 532, Am. Fed. Emp. v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 273 So.2d 441 (Fla. 4th Dist.
1973); Talcott v. Central Bank & Trust Co., 220 So.2d 411 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969); Mc-
Laughlin v. Metropolitan Dade County, 191 So.2d 615 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966); Kickliter v.
National Union Fire Ins. Co., 188 So.2d 872 (Fla 1st Dist. 1966). Contra, Groover v. Adiv
Holding Co., 202 So.2d 102 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967) (affirming dismissals on grounds that de-
fendants were entitled to judgment on the merits) and Heath v. Central Truck Lines, 195
So.2d 588 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1967). The latter two decisions seem clearly wrong.
87. BoRcHARD, supra note 2 at 477-924 (civil), 1020-36 (criminal); 2 W. ANDERSON,
DECLARATORY JUDGMEMNTS §§ 496-750 (2d ed. 1951) (hereinafter cited as ANDERSON).
19721
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXVII
declarations have been rendered on the validity, interpretation and breach
of contracts.8 8 Similar relief has been granted as to leases, 89 trusts, 90
and wills.9'
Under the more inclusive provisions of the 1943 Act, new subjects
have been opened to declaratory judgment. In real property cases, actions
have been allowed to determine the marketability of a title which plain-
tiff title company had insured;9 2 to determine a boundary line;9 ' and to
establish interests in land or in the proceeds of its sale.94 In personal
property cases, declarations have been granted to determine the owner-
ship of corporate stock95 and to decide whether a decedent had made a
gift of a note.96
The broad authority granted by the 1943 Act in the field of public
law has been exercised in many cases. Declarations have been granted on
the constitutional validity of statutes9 7 and ordinances; 98 instructing pub-
lic officials as to their rights and duties under the constitution99 and stat-
utes; 100 and determining whether a municipal corporation had been legally
organized so as to settle a conflict in governmental jurisdiction.101
88. Dwiggins v. Roth, 37 So.2d 702 (Fla. 1948); Florida Power Corp. v. City of Talla-
hassee, 154 Fla. 638, 18 So.2d 671 (1944); Jacksonville Land Holding Co. v. American Oil
Co., 136 Fla. 491, 188 So. 809 (1938); Goodman v. Winn-Dixie Stores. Inc., 240 So.2d 496
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1970); Gars v. Woodard, 214 So.2d 385 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968); Breuil v.
Hobbs, 166 So.2d 825 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964); Rodgers v. Kajax Realty Co., 165 So.2d 259
(Fla. 1st. Dist. 1964); Jackson Tom. Inc. v. Carlton, 133 So.2d 752 (Fla. 1st. Dist. 1961);
Coast Cities Coaches v. Whyte, 102 So. 2d 848 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1958).
89. Hyman v. Cohen, 73 So.2d 393 (Fla. 1954); Lincoln Tower Corp. v. Dunhall's-
Florida, 61 So.2d 474 (Fla. 1952); Garden Suburbs Golf & Country Club, Inc. v. Pruitt,
156 Fla. 825, 24 So.2d 898 (1946); Mayfair Operating Corp. v. Bessemer Properties, IncL,
150 Fla. 132, 7 So.2d 342 (1942) ; Bal Harbour Towers, Inc. v. Keller, 227 So.2d 219 (Fla.
3d Dist. 1969); J.S. Michael Co. v. Rayonier, Inc., 212 So.2d 824 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968);
Tulip Realty Co. v. Fuhrer, 155 So.2d 637 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963); North Shore Realty Corp.
v. Gallaher, 99 So.2d 255 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1957).
90. Griley v. Rackley, 135 Fla. 824, 185 So. 734 (1939).
91. Roberts v. Mosely, 100 Fla. 267, 129 So. 835 (1930).
92. Tamiami Abstract & Title Co. v. Malanka, 185 So.2d 493 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
93. Bozeman v. Roberts, 188 So.2d 23 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966).
94. Goldberg v. Michalik, 237 So.2d 298 (Fla. 2d Dist, 1970) (interest in proceeds of
sale); P & N Inv. Corp. v. Florida Ranchettes, Inc., 220 So.2d 451 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968)
(interest in land); Bamber v. Bamber, 216 So.2d 806 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968) (interest in land);
Singer v. Tobin, 201 So.2d 799 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967) (interest in land); Rice v. Fremow,
165 So.2d 447 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964) (interest in land).
95. Central Life Ins. Co. v. Afro-American Life Ins. Co., 74 So.2d 363 (Fla. 1954);
Day v. Norman, 42 So.2d 273 (Fla. 1949); Price v. Rome, 222 So.2d 252 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1969); Hewitt v. Price, 222 So.2d 247 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969); Davidson v. Miami Beach First
Nat'l Bank, 215 So.2d 623 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
96. Lungu v. Walters, 198 So.2d 99 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
97. Eelbeck Milling Co. v. Mayo, 86 So.2d 438 (Fla. 1956); McInerney v. Ervin, 46
So.2d 458 (Fla. 1950); Satan Fraternity v. Board of Pub. Instruc., 156 Fla. 222, 22 So.2d
892 (1945).
98. Pace v. King, 38 So.2d 823 (Fla. 1949); City of Miami v. Rosenthal, 208 So.2d
495 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
99. Brautigam v. White, 64 So. 2d 781 (Fla. 1953).
100. Overman v. State Bd. of Control, 62 So.2d 696 (Fla. 1952); State v. City of
Miami, 54 So.2d 250 (Fla. 1951); Board of County Comm'rs v. Sloan, 214 So.2d 74 (Fla.
2d Dist. 1968).
101. Town of Daytona Beach Shores v. Foster, 135 So.2d 903 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962).
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The 1943 Act provides both general authority to declare rights,
privileges and immunities, and specific authority to pass on administra-
tive regulations. °2 These grants of power must, of course, be construed to-
gether with the constitutional08 and statutory'" provisions, as well as the
rules of court,0 5 relating to quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial action by
administrative agencies and judicial review thereof.0 6 The Florida courts
have decided that if an administrative agency holds a trial-type hearing,
in which a record is made and an adjudicative final order is entered, the
exclusive method of review is by certiorari, either in the district court of
appeal or in the circuit court. 07 However, other administrative actions
or failures to act, and all administrative rules and regulations, may be
reviewed by declaratory action in the circuit court. 8 The confusion in
the language and even in the decisions of the cases as to when certiorari
is available and when a declaratory suit is available has been trenchantly
criticized by Professor Kenneth Davis.0 9 Certainly it seems that the
Florida courts have erected unnecessary procedural hurdles to the re-
view of administrative actions by holding that certiorari and declaratory
judgment are mutually exclusive, especially since declaratory actions are
necessarily filed in the circuit court and certiorari proceedings must often
be filed in the district court of appeal. To some extent, the dilemma pre-
sented to the practitioner has been eased by decisions that a claimant
may proceed simultaneously by both certiorari and declaratory action,
and thus avoid loss of rights pendente lite." °
Since tax assessments represent one type of administrative action
102. FLA. STAT. §§ 86.011, 86.021 (1971).
103. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 4(b)(1)(2).
104. FLA. STAT. §§ 120.30-.31 (1971).
105. FLA. R. App. P. 4.1.
106. Statutory provisions too numerous to cite govern judicial review of specific agency
actions.
107. Meiklejohn v. American Distrib., Inc., 210 So.2d 259 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968); Loew
v. Dade County, 188 So.2d 869 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966); Carol Cities Util., Inc., v. Dade
County, 143 So.2d 828 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962). But see Florida Indus. Comm'n v. Neal, 224
So.2d 774 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969) (claimant allowed to attack legality of organization of
Industrial Commission by declaratory action rather than by certiorari); Johnson v.
Thoburn, 160 So.2d 729 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964) (declaratory action available to construe a
notice issued by Florida Board of Dental Examiners).
108. Bayne v. Florida State Bd. of Dispensing Opticians, 212 So.2d 762 (Fla. 1968);
Teston v. City of Tampa, 143 So.2d 473 (Fla. 1962); Goldstein v. Sweeny, 42 So.2d 367
(Fla. 1949); Bay Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Dickinson, 229 So.2d 302 (Fla. Ist Dist.
1969); Jezek v. Vordemaier, 227 So.2d 69 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969); Hardwick v. Florida
Citrus Comm'n, 207 So.2d 746 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968), cert, denied, 214 So.2d 622 (Fla. 1968) ;
Dade County v. Jim's Northwest, Inc., 171 So.2d 612 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965); Hillsborough
County v. Twin Lakes Mobile Home Village, Inc., 153 So.2d 64 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963);
Bloomfield v. Mayo, 119 So.2d 417 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1960). BORCA&RD, supra note 2 at 875-
924 contains an extensive discussion.
109. K. DAVIS, ADM NISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, § 24.06 (3d ed. 1972), discussing Bloom-
field v. Mayo, 119 So.2d 417 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1960). Bloomfield was expressly approved in
Teston v. City of Tampa, 143 So.2d 473 (Fla. 1962).
110. City Council v. Trebor Constr. Co., 254 So.2d 51 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971); Canney v.
Board of Pub. Instruc., 222 So.2d 803 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969); Alderman v. Connor, 152
So.2d 819 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
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taken without a hearing, they may be reviewed through declaratory judg-
ments. Declarations have been issued on the validity of tax assessment
rolls;I" the validity of a statutory increase in a license fee; 112 plaintiffs'
rights to tax exemptions;"11 and the validity of tax sale certificates." 4
Although the 1943 Act does not expressly authorize review of exec-
utive action, the courts allow declaratory suits to review executive action
or failure to act," 5 provided, of course, that the particular question pre-
sented does not fall within the range of governmental exemption or non-
reviewable discretion." 6 Declaratory judgment has been held available
to establish the validity or invalidity of municipal bonds, in a suit by the
holder" 7 or by the municipality."' However, the statute providing a spe-
cial form of declaratory action by which a municipality may validate its
bonds must be followed where applicable." 9
In a number of cases attempts have been made to use declaratory
actions to invalidate judgments or decrees previously entered in other
cases, or to construe such judgments or decrees. Judgments and decrees
are not among the "instruments in writing" specifically enumerated in
the act, but the general power to declare the existence or nonexistence of
any right would seem broad enough to apply to them. 2 ° Obviously, how-
ever, such an attempt to substitute collateral attack for direct review
might conflict with the provisions of law governing appeals and those de-
signed to give finality to judgments. Declaratory actions attacking the
validity of prior judgments or decrees have, therefore, been dismissed
unless the prior judgment was void, rather than merely erroneous or void-
able.' On the other hand, where the parties are merely uncertain as to
111. Reid v. Kirk, 257 So.2d 3 (Fla. 1972); Townsend v. Gray, 181 So.2d 612 (Fla.
Ist Dist. 1966).
112. Mayo v. National Truck Brokers, Inc., 220 So.2d 11 (Fla. 1969).
113. Ammerman v. Markham, 222 So.2d 423 (Fla. 1969); Memorial Home Community
v. Smith, 214 So.2d 77 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968).
114. Board of Pub. Instruc. v. Little River Valley Drainage Dist., 119 So.2d 323 (Fla.
3d Dist. 1960). Contra, Woodman v. Jones, 101 Fla. 177, 133 So. 620 (1931) (under the
Florida Declaratory Judgments Act of 1919, which, by section 1, was limited to "question[s]
of construction arising under the instrument").
115. Adams v. Gunter, 238 So.2d 824 (Fla. 1970).
116. Declaratory judgment is often interchangeable with mandamus in this area. See
text at note 233 infra.
117. Alsop v. Pierce, 155 Fla. 185, 19 So.2d 799 (1944).
118. Mize v. County of Seminole, 229 So.2d 841 (Fla. 1969).
119. Bessemer Properties v. City of Opalocka, 74 So.2d 296 (Fla. 1954) (applying the
Bond Validation Act, currently FLA. STAT. §§ 75.01-.17 (1971)).
120. "The circuit courts have jurisdiction to declare rights, status and other equitable or
legal relations . . . . The court may render declaratory judgments on the existence or non-
existence: (1) Of any immunity, power, privilege or right . . ." FLA. STAT. § 86.011
(1971).
121. Declaratory actions dismissed in Stahl v. Wilson, 121 So.2d 662 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1960); City of North Miami Beach v. Bernay, 117 So.2d 863 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1960). Declara-
tory action allowed to attack void foreign decree in Kittel v. Kittel, 164 So.2d 833 (Fla.
3d Dist. 1964).
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their rights under a decree in a prior case, a declaratory order answering
their questions has been granted. 22
The 1943 Act clearly grants the circuit courts jurisdiction to declare
not only the law, but also the "existence, or nonexistence . . . [o] f any
fact upon which . . . such immunity, power, privilege or right does or
may depend .... ,12 The legislative intent is further demonstrated by
the provision of the act that "[w]hen an action under this chapter con-
cerns the determination of an issue of fact, the issue may be tried as
issues of fact are tried in other civil actions,"'124 and by a jury, if appro-
priate. Thus, where disputed questions of fact must be resolved before
the law can be applied, and the questions of law are appropriate for de-
claratory judgment, the circuit courts are given jurisdiction to resolve
both types of questions, and have done so in numerous cases. Neverthe-
less, in other cases courts have refused to entertain declaratory actions
because the only doubt was as to the "facts" on which the parties' rights
depended. If the courts were holding that they lacked declaratory juris-
diction in cases involving only questions of fact, then these cases are
contrary to the statute, contrary to numerous other Florida decisions,
contrary to many decisions in other jurisdictions, and contrary to the
opinions of text writers on the subject. Therefore, the preferable inter-
pretation of those decisions is not that the courts held they lacked juris-
diction, but that, in their discretion, they declined to exercise it. We shall
consider judicial discretion in declaratory cases, and other authorities on
the subject, at a later point.12e
Up to the present time, the Florida decisions in declaratory judg-
ment cases do not reflect any particular difficulty in distinguishing be-
tween "legal" and "non-legal" issues. The subject matter of the various
cases brought before the state courts has generally been within tradi-
tional limits, and the principal problems have arisen in connection with
the other elements of a justiciable controversy. Nevertheless, the increas-
ing tendency, both state and federal, to expand governmental power into
new fields, and the need for the courts to assert their rightful authority
over legal issues in those fields, presage increased litigation in the future
on this element of justiciability.
B. Ripeness of the Case
In order to present a controversy, and thus fall within the judicial
power of the courts under the Florida constitution, a case must be "ripe,"
122. Fleming v. State Rd. Dept., 157 Fla. 164, 25 So.2d 376 (1946); Koscot Inter-
planetary, Inc. v. State, 230 So.2d 24 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970). Contra, deMarigny v.
deMarigny, 43 So.2d 442, 444 (Fla. 1949), on the ground that decrees are not included in
"deed, will, contract or other article, memorandum or instrument in writing," and because
the decree was clear. The firststated ground seems erroneous.
123. FLA. STAT. § 86.011 (1971) (emphasis added).
124. FLA. STAT. § 86.071 (1971) (emphasis added).
125. See section IV infra.
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but not overripe or "moot." The questions presented, in other words,
must be live and genuine, not dead or hypothetical. The policy values
inherent in this requirement go to the very essence of the courts' place
in the constitutional scheme of things. If courts take jurisdiction over
cases which do not present live questions, they are not deciding the legal
relations of the parties before them, but instead are giving advisory opin-
ions as to past or future conduct. Such decisions would often constitute
judicial legislation, and thus violate the separation of powers require-
ment of the constitution. Furthermore, they are subject to an equally
serious objection from the point of view of the courts themselves. Giv-
ing advisory opinions is an abandonment of the fundamental wisdom of
Anglo-American jurisprudence, which counsels that correct conclusions
are more likely to be reached when the judicial mind is focused on the
application of legal principles to specific facts.
The question remains, of course, as to when a particular case is
"live" and therefore "ripe" for judicial determination. The statutes have
given little guidance on this score. The Florida Declaratory Judgments
Act of 1919, authorizing declaratory judgments only for the construction
of written instruments, did not mention the subject at all, and impliedly
invited the courts to apply their pre-existing standards of ripeness in
declaratory actions. 2 ' The 1943 Act, as amended, authorizes declara-
tions concerning any immunity, power, privilege or right, "whether such
immunity, power, privilege or right now exists or will arise in the fu-
ture;" 2 7 and provides that "[a] contract may be construed either before
or after there has been a breach of it."' 28 Further, it authorizes a de-
claratory judgment "by way of anticipation with respect to any act not
yet done or any event which has not yet happened," making such an-
ticipatory declaration as binding on the parties "as if that act or event
had already been done or had already happened before the judgment
was rendered,"'21 9 and omits the express requirement, contained in the
federal Declaratory Judgments Act and the acts of some other states, that
there be an "actual controversy" in declaratory cases."' If the above
language were literally interpreted, it would abolish the ripeness require-
ment altogether. Obviously the Florida Legislature had no such intention,
and no such construction would be constitutionally permissible. The ques-
tion of ripeness is therefore left to interpretation by the courts, bearing in
mind the liberal legislative intent disclosed by the language quoted.
The declaratory procedure, which is designed to afford parties judi-
cial relief at an earlier stage of their actual or potential dispute, often
126. Law of June 9, 1919, ch. 7857, §§ 1-2, [1919] Fla. Laws 148 (repealed 1943). The
text of the act is set out in note 11 Supra.
127. FLA. STAT. § 86.011 (1971).
128. FLA. STAT. § 86.031 (1971).
129. FLA. STAT. § 86.051 (1971).
130. Declaratory Judgments Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1970).
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raises questions of ripeness in an acute form. No one realized this bet-
ter than Professor Borchard, who prefaced his discussion of ripeness by
pointing out that "the danger or dilemma of the plaintiff must be present,
not contingent on the happening of hypothetical future events ...and
the prejudice to his position must be actual and genuine and not merely
possible or remote."'' On the other hand, he asserted that
a controversy as to legal rights is as fully determinable before
as it is after one or the other party has acted on his own view
of his rights and perhaps irretrievably shattered the status quo.
Such violence and destruction make the issue more painful and
socially undesirable, but they do not make it any more contro-
versial." 2
Obviously the two statements are in tension, and are difficult to
reconcile. If the first be emphasized, it might be said that the declara-
tory remedy has added little to the existing arsenal. If the second be
emphasized, it might be thought that parties could present to the court
any hypothesis concerning future action and obtain a judgment on it.
The key to resolving the difficulty is genuineness, i.e., that the danger
to the plaintiff may be based in part on future events, provided that the
danger is real and that those events are not merely "hypothetical."
Thus, two requirements for ripeness of a declaratory action can be
isolated. First, the threat to plaintiff's right, status, immunity, power or
privilege must have either occurred or be reasonably likely to occur, and
must be sufficiently substantial to warrant plaintiff's reasonable appre-
hension. Second, the right, status, immunity, power or privilege which
is threatened must arise from events that have either already happened
or are reasonably certain to happen.
As to the first requirement, it is obvious that the substantiality of
the jeopardy or threat will sometimes be a question of fact and some-
times one of law. If the defendant has actually threatened the plain-
tiff, and possesses the apparent intention and ability to carry out his
threat, the legal conclusion would normally be that reasonable danger
to plaintiff's right or other legal interest exists. In most cases, however,
no actual threat is required in order to entitle plaintiff to a declaration,
-provided defendant has the apparent intention and ability to harm plain-
tiff's interest. This is particularly true in the case of a statute, criminal
or civil, which on its face jeopardizes plaintiff, leaving only the question
of whether the statute will be enforced.1 38 On the other hand, where the
statute delegates enforcement discretion to an administrative agency,
and the agency has not yet determined whether enforcement should be
131. BORCHARD, supra note 2 at 56.
132. Id. at 58.
133. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965); Rosenhouse v. 1950 Spring Term
Grand Jury, 56 So.2d 445 (Fla. 1952) ; Borchard, Challenging "Penal" Statutes by Delcara-
tory Action, 52 YALE L.J. 445 (1943).
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attempted against persons in plaintiff's situation, plaintiff is not yet in
jeopardy and should be required to await the agency decision before
seeking judicial protection.8 4
The question of what specific action or inaction by defendant may
jeopardize the plaintiff is closely related to the question of the existence
or nonexistence of adverse interests, and will be discussed below in the
section dealing with the adversary character of the proceeding.'85 There-
fore, the remaining discussion of ripeness will deal only with the second
point mentioned above-the extent to which plaintiff's right, status, im-
munity, power or privilege must be based on events that have already
happened, and the extent to which any of them may be based on events
in the future. Assuming that the requirement of jeopardy to plaintiff has
been met, we may now bring the second requirement into focus.
The question is, under what circumstances, if any, should a plain-
tiff be allowed to obtain a declaration of the legal consequences of future
events? The question can, be most conveniently examined by dividing
the pertinent cases into three classes: (1) cases where the danger is to
the plaintiff's present legal status or his ability to continue conduct in
which he is already engaged; (2) cases where the danger is to future
status or future events which are highly probable and of a specific char-
acter; and (3) cases where the danger is to future status or future events
which are mere possibilities and have not yet been specifically defined.
1. EXISTING STATUS OR PRESENT CONDUCT
Where plaintiff asks for a declaration concerning his legal status
based on existing facts, or concerning his privilege or immunity to con-
tinue conduct in which he is already engaged, the facts are fully devel-
oped, and the court has no difficulty in declaring their legal significance.
The point is so clear that often the court will grant a declaratory judg-
ment without even finding it necessary to discuss its right to do so. Thus,
declarations have been granted determining whether plaintiff policeman
held a permanent civil service appointment in the force;' 6 whether plain-
tiff corporation was the actual owner of shares of stock in defendant cor-
poration;187 whether plaintiff's grantor had reserved grazing rights in a
deed to defendant's predecessor in title; 3 s and whether a psychologist
might continue to practice his profession without obtaining a certificate
134. Morrison v. Plotkin, 77 So.2d 254 (Fla. 1955). On the other hand, plaintiff is
entitled to declaratory relief where the agency has unlawfully threatened criminal prosecu-
tion, Husband v. Cassel, 130 So.2d 69 (Fla. 1961), or plaintiff has exhausted his adminis-
trative remedies, Hillsborough County v. Twin Lakes Mobile Home Village, Inc., 153 So.2d
64 (Fla. 2d Dist, 1963).
135. See section III, C(2) infra.
136. City of St. Petersburg v. Bolender, 54 So.2d 31 (Fla. 1951); Guilford v. City of
Miami, 169 So.2d 42 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
137. Central Life Ins. Co. v. Afro-American Life Ins. Co., 74 So.2d 363 (Fla. 1954).
138. Wiggins v. Lykes Bros., 97 So.2d 273 (Fla. 1957).
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from the State Board of Examiners, on the ground that the statute au-
thorizing the granting of certificates was unconstitutional.8 9 Declara-
tions have also been rendered as to whether plaintiff had been released
from liability under a guaranty which he had executed; 40 whether plain-
tiff could maintain its advertising signs without interference by a city
under an allegedly unconstitutional ordinance;' 4' whether a lease of a
restaurant would vest permanent ownership of the restaurant's liquor
license in the lessees, or whether the license would revert to the land-
lords at the end of the lease;' 42 and whether a fireman was eligible for
promotion at once, or had to wait for a vacancy in a higher position. 48
The last cited decision is of particular interest, because it shows that the
declaration need not decide the entire case, provided that it finally dis-
poses of a separable issue. A declaration that the fireman was eligible
for promotion would not, of course, guarantee him the higher position-
that would be determined by funds available and other factors within
administrative discretion-but would merely declare unlawful defen-
dants' present ground for refusing to consider him. The case is a clear
illustration of a situation in which mandatory relief would not be avail-
able, and plaintiff would be without a remedy if he could not obtain a
declaratory judgment.
Where the court is asked to issue a declaration concerning an ad-
ministrative process before the agency proceedings are completed, plain-
tiff's remedy before the agency must be either lacking or clearly inade-
quate. Obviously, if the agency lacks constitutional or statutory power
to act, there is no administrative remedy and plaintiff may seek an im-
mediate judicial declaration. 44 If the administrative remedy is clearly
inadequate, the same result follows. For example, plaintiff may show the
court that the agency has adopted an illegal, self-executing rule, and that
his livelihood or other vital interest is threatened with substantial injury
unless the court grants immediate relief.145 The advantage of using de-
claratory rather than injunctive proceedings in this situation is that a
lesser showing of threatened injury is necessary for a declaration than
for an injunction, which might have the effect of stopping in its tracks
a coordinate branch of the government.'46
139. Husband v. Cassel, 130 So.2d 69 (Fla. 1961).
140. Hollywood Shopping Plaza, Inc. v. Schuyler, 179 So.2d 573 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
141. City of Sarasota v. Sunad, Inc., 181 So.2d 11 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
142. Marconi v. Schimmel, 181 So.2d 167 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
143. McLaughlin v. Metropolitan Dade County, 191 So.2d 615 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
144. Husband v. Cassel, 130 So.2d 69 (Fla. 1961) (statute unconstitutional); Florida
Indus. Comm'n v. Neal, 224 So.2d 774 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969) (agency constituted in violation
of statute).
145. Stadnick v. Shell's City, Inc., 140 So.2d 871 (Fla. 1962); Florida Citrus Comm'n
v. Owens, 239 So.2d 840 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970). The principle was established much earlier
for the federal courts in Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407 (1942).
146. Florida State Bd. of Medical Exm'rs v. James, 158 So.2d 574 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
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2. SPECIFIC FUTURE STATUS OR EVENTS
If the only contingency standing in the way of a specific future
status or event is the plaintiff's will to bring it about, and he declares
a positive intention to do so, the classic case for invoking the declara-
tory remedy is presented. Prior to the declaratory judgment statutes,
plaintiff's only course of action was to engage in the conduct, create
the status, or cause the events to occur, taking the risk that his legal
position was incorrect. 147 The Florida Declaratory Judgments Act spe-
cifically authorizes declaratory judgments "by way of anticipation with
respect to any act not yet done or any event which has not yet hap-
pened," and thus corrects this situation.'4 8 Following the policy thus
declared, the courts have issued declarations as to the legality of en-
gaging in a particular business or profession under specified circum-
stances, which plaintiff declared his intention to do; 4 ' the authority of
a church to enter into a proposed contract using the assets of a trust
created by a will; '1 0 the right of a landowner to demolish an encroaching
building;'' and the legal authority of a town to issue public improve-
ment certificates which the town intended to sell.'5 2 They have also
rendered declaratory judgments as to whether a landlord had a lien on
his tenant's liquor license, which he threatened to enforce if it existed;'15 3
whether a tenant exercising an option to purchase could exercise the
rights of an owner immediately, or had to wait until the end of the
term;... the validity of statutes relating to county clerical help and other
matters, which plaintiff budget commission wished to determine in order
to prepare its budget; 5 5 and the validity of specific action which a
county declared its intention to take if it might lawfully do so. 3 6
Where contingencies beyond plaintiff's control stand in the way of
specific future events, the jurisdictional question is much more difficult
to answer. On the one hand, the future events must not be merely "hy-
pothetical," because then there is no genuine controversy. Hence, the
courts rightly reject complaints seeking declarations as to future events
147. E.g., Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Ass'n, 277 U.S. 429 (1933), discussed in the
text of note 6 supra. The same result followed under the Florida Declaratory Judgments
Act of 1919. See Tankersley v. Davis, 128 Fla. 507, 175 So. 501 (1937).
148. FLA. STAT. § 86.051 (1971).
149. Holley v. Adams, 238 So.2d 401 (Fla. 1970); Bayou Barber College v. Mincey,
193 So.2d 610 (Fla. 1967); Mercer v. Hemmings, 194 So.2d 579 (Fla. 1966); Glackman v.
City of Miami Beach, 159 Fla. 376, 31 So.2d 393 (1947). See Bryant v. Gray, 70 So.2d
581 (Fla. 1954) (declaration denied where plaintiff did not allege positive intention to act).
150. Florida Nat'l Bank v. Rector, Wardens & Vestry of St.. John's Parish, 45 So.2d
751 (Fla. 1950).
151. May v. Holley, 59 So.2d 636 (Fla. 1952).
152. North Shore Bank v. Town of Surfside, 72 So.2d 659 (Fla. 1954).
153. James v. Golson, 92 So.2d 180 (Fla. 1957).
154. Platt v. General Dev. Corp., 122 So.2d 48 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1960).
155. Walker v. Pendarvis, 132 So.2d 186 (Fla. 1961).
156. Coast Cities Coaches, Inc. v. Dade County, 178 So.2d 703 (Fla. 1965); Dade
County v. Dade County League of Municipalities, 102 So.2d 512 (Fla. 1958).
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which may or may not come to pass. 57 On the other hand, where the
feed for a present declaration exists, and the future status or event is
specific, the declaration may be granted. For example, an insured claim-
ing present total disability, which is disputed by the insurer, may need
to know whether he must pay future premiums to keep his policy alive,
and a declaration finding that the disability exists and relieving him of
future payments until the insurer proves a change of condition seems
fully justified."6 8 If plaintiff seeks a declaration interpreting a will grant-
ing him a future contingent interest in property, he may succeed in ob-
taining it by showing special circumstances creating a need for the
declaration, and proof that under the mortality tables he will probably
be the survivor.' In these situations, the combination of need for the
relief, a fact situation which is specific even though contingent, and a
strong probability that the contingent events will come to pass make the
case concrete and genuine, and thus ripe for decision.
3. NONSPECIFic FUTUpE EVENTS
In this class of cases, plaintiff seeks a declaration concerning future
conduct or events which are contingent and not specifically described
in the complaint. In effect he asks the court to rule hypothetically on
all the possibilities, and even to select a course of action which it would
advise him to take. The answer to such a request would seem obvious,
yet the United States Supreme Court has wavered on this question, some-
times granting declarations as to the constitutional validity of possible
government action regulating nonspecific future conduct in which plain-
tiff may or may not choose to engage.6 0 The Florida courts have con-
157. Anderson v. Dimick, 77 So.2d 867 (Fla. 1955); Donovan v. Schott, 58 So.2d 847
(Fla. 1952); City of Pensacola v. Johnson, 28 So.2d 905 (Fla. 1947).
158. Under the majority view, in an action at law for damages, the insured is limited
to judgment for amounts due him at the time of suit, even though he claims total and
permanent disability. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Viglas, 297 U.S. 672 (1936); Greguhn v.
Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 23 Utah 2d 214, 461 P.2d 285 (1969). Contra, John Hancock
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Cohen, 254 F.2d 417 (9th Cir. 1958); Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y
of United States v. Branham, 250 Ky. 472, 63 S.W.2d 498 (1933) (allowing judgment for
future installments to be paid when due, subject to the right of the insurance company to
reopen the judgment and show termination of disability). Damages to date in such cases are
wholly inadequate, since the insured needs a declaration as a guide to his future conduct.
5 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 118 at 663 (1964). If insured's only claim is for
waiver of premiums, a declaration may be his sole remedy. Cf. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v.
Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937) (granting a declaration of non-disability to the insurance
company).
159. See cases collected in the following: Annot., 139 A.L.R. 1239 (1942) (declaratory
relief withrespect to rights of or rights against estate of decedent prior to his death);
Annot., 174 A.L.R. 880 (1948) (declaratory or advisory relief respecting future interest);
Annot., 80 A.L.R.2d 941 (1961) (declaratory judgment, during lifetime of spouses, as to
construction of antenuptial agreement dealing with property rights of survivor). The need
for the declaration is ordinarily based on present availability of evidence or improvement of
marketability of the property concerned.
160. Compare Alabama State Fed'n of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450 (1945) (declara-
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sistently rejected such requests as nonjusticiable. Thus, they have refused
to declare the validity of future prosecutions based on conduct not spe-
cifically described; 161 to advise plaintiff as to whether defendants had
a right of way of necessity over plaintiff's land, when the existence of
such way of necessity would depend on the use to which defendants put
their land in the future;' 62 to advise a fraternal order as to what use it
should make of its real property in order to obtain a tax exemption;...
and to advise an attorney as to the validity of the law creating the small
claims court, in order that he might counsel future clients as to where
they should bring their suits. 6 4
As the above cases show, the Florida decisions have developed a
doctrine of ripeness which is both self-consistent and generally in accor-
dance with the policy of the Declaratory Judgments Act. Declarations
have regularly been issued with respect to present status or conduct, and
with respect to future specific status or events which are either inherently
highly probable, or which the plaintiff intends and is able to bring about.
Declarations have regularly been refused with respect to a future status
or future events which were neither probable nor within the power of
plaintiff to bring about, or which were presented vaguely or as alternative
possibilities.
C. Adversary Character of the Proceeding
In order to permit an exercise of "judicial power" under the new
judicial article of the Florida Constitution, or to constitute a "case" un-
der the former judicial article, there must be an "adversary proceed-
ing."'16 In declaratory cases, an "adversary proceeding" requires (1) a
plaintiff with standing, i.e., claiming some immunity, power, privilege or
right dependent upon the facts or the law, and (2) a defendant possessing
some adverse interest in the same subject matter.' 6 The complaint must
of course allege these adverse interests,'6 7 which give rise to doubt as
to plaintiff's legal position..6
8
tion denied), with Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959)
(declaration granted).
161. Ervin v. City of North Miami Beach, 66 So.2d 235 (Fla. 1953); Perry v. Genung,
163 So.2d 54 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
162. Hunt v. Smith, 137 So.2d 232 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
163. Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks v. Dade County, 166 So.2d 605 (Fla. 3d
Dist. 1964).
164. McNevin v. Baker, 170 So.2d 66 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
165. First Nat'l Bank v. Bebinger, 99 Fla. 1290, 128 So. 862 (1930).
166. May v. Holley, 59 So.2d 636, 639 (Fla. 1952).
167. Sarasota-Fruitville Drainage Dist. v. Certain Lands, 80 So.2d 335 (Fla. 1955);
State v. Lewis, 72 So.2d 823 (Fla. 1954); Miller v. Miller, 151 So.2d 869 (Fla. 2d Dist.
1963) (all holding that failure to allege adverse interests requires dismissal).
168. See text at notes 196-202 infra.
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1. STANDING OF PLAINTIFF
The question of when a plaintiff has standing to sue involves one
of the most controversial and rapidly developing fields of constitutional
and administrative law. 69 It is often said that the plaintiff must have
a "legal interest," but, as Borchard prophetically stated over thirty
years ago, "[t]he idea of 'legal interest' is an expanding conception and
rules of practice should not be used as a bar to its development."'7 0 It
is therefore necessary to examine the present status of that "expanding
conception," and attempt to trace the course of its development.
At one time the courts were disposed to say that only a plaintiff
asserting a "legal right" had standing to sue, but this position has been
repudiated in constitutional cases by the Supreme Court of Florida'"'
and by the United States Supreme Court.7 It is also the clear intent
of the Florida Declaratory Judgments Act to reject that restricted inter-
pretation. The act grants to the circuit courts jurisdiction to declare a
right, immunity, power, privilege, status "and other equitable or legal
relations; "'17 and authorizes a plaintiff to sue to determine the validity
or construction of any statute, ordinance, contract, deed, will, franchise
or other article, memorandum or instrument in writing if he claims or
is "in doubt" about his rights under any of them, or if his "rights, status,
or other legal or equitable relations are affected" by any of them. 74
Further, the 1943 Act specifically includes among authorized plaintiffs
the fiduciaries, creditors and beneficiaries of a trust or estate, 75 and pro-
vides that parties to an action may include "all persons . . . who have
or claim any interest which would be affected by the declaration."'76
The statute thus makes clear that (a) the plaintiff's interest need
,not be a "legal right," but can be a right, immunity, power, privilege,
status or other legal or equitable relation; (b) plaintiff need not assert
that the legal or equitable relation is created by a statute, ordinance,
contract, deed, will, franchise or other instrument in writing, so long as
it is "affected" by any of them; and (c) if plaintiff does assert that the
legal or equitable relation may arise under any such instrument in writ-
ing, he need not make a positive claim but may merely assert the exist-
ence of a "doubt." The act appears to grant standing to the full extent
permissible under the constitution, leaving to the courts the determina-
169. See, e.g., the report on the action of the House of Delegates of the ABA in 58
A.B.A.J. 1075-78 (1972).
170. BORCHARD, supra note 2 at 203.
171. Keating v. State, 173 So.2d 673 (Fla. 1965).
172. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Willner v. Committee on Character
and Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963).
173. FLA. STAT. § 86.011 (1971).
174. FLA. STAT. § 86.021 (1971).
175. FLA. STAT. § 86.041 (1971).
176. FLA. STAT. § 86.091 (1971).
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tion of whether they will exercise or decline to exercise the power granted
them in any particular case. As the following discussion will show, the
judicial interpretation of the act has not always been consistent with
the liberal legislative intent so clearly expressed.
Where plaintiff can show injury in fact, either actual or reasonably
apprehended, to any legally cognizable interest, it would seem obvious
that he should have standing to sue. The courts have issued declarations
protecting plaintiff's actual or potential financial interests from harm
arising from the unlawful grant of a zoning variance to plaintiff's com-
petitor, or the unlawful refusal to issue an occupational license to plain-
tiff. 7 However, the interest protected need not be financial, as is shown
by the grant of standing to churches to prevent nearby liquor sales in
violation of an ordinance . 7
Surprisingly, however, other cases have denied standing even though
demonstrable financial harm to the plaintiff was threatened. In one of
the earliest decisions after the passage of the 1943 Act, the court said
that the statute did not authorize a labor union to obtain, against a city,
a declaration that it was the city's duty to recognize the union as bar-
gaining agent for city employees, because the union lacked "a bona fide
and direct interest in the result." 79 Plaintiff had alleged that its mem-
bers were coerced and intimidated by defendant, and that it had reason
to fear that they would be discharged; thus, it seems obvious that both
the union's financial interest in receiving dues and its alleged right to
represent its members were threatened. The court appears to have con-
fused the issue of standing to sue with the merits. Plaintiff should have
had standing, whether or not it would ultimately lose at a trial. In an-
other case, a district court of appeal denied standing to a plaintiff, lessee
of land from a port authority, who claimed a right of access to a state
road, and alleged that defendant's denial of access had caused a loan com-
mitment obtained by plaintiff to be cancelled. 8 Again a court appears
to have denied standing because of its view that plaintiff could not pre-
vail on the merits. Such decisions are incorrect on their facts, are con-
trary to the many cases which have declared that the right to a declara-
tion is a question entirely separate from the merits,' 8' and should be
vigorously repudiated.
177. Bayne v. Florida State Bd. of Dispensing Opticians, 212 So.2d 762 (Fla. 1968)
(refusal to issue occupational license); Brown v. Foley, 158 Fla. 734, 29 So.2d 870 (1947)
(refusal to issue occupational license); City of Miami v. Franklin Leslie, Inc., 179 So.2d
622 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965) (unlawful grant of zoning variance).
178. Banyan Cafeterias, Inc. v. Faith Lutheran Church, 151 So.2d 426 (Fla. 1963);
Dade County v. Jim's Northwest, Inc., 171 So.2d 612 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
179. Miami Water Works Local 654 v. City of Miami, 157 Fla. 445, 452, 26 So.2d 194,
198 (1946).
180. Canaveral Marine, Inc. v. Canaveral Port Authority, 244 So.2d 764 (Fla. 4th Dist.
1971).
181. See cases cited in note 85 supra.
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The incorrectness of decisions denying standing to a plaintiff who
has shown special damage to himself is emphasized by the numerous
cases granting standing to taxpayers who showed no damage different
from that of every other taxpayer in the community. Thus, individual
taxpayers have obtained declarations concerning the legality of general
tax levies at the county-wide assessment level; 18 2 the legality of public
expenditures having no specific impact on the plaintiffs; 88 and other
subjects of general fiscal interest.18 4 There has, however, been a tendency
to insist that, where a public interest is being vindicated by a private
citizen, the interest has to be financial."8 5 The writer submits that this
is a very benighted concept of the public interest to be served by citi-
zens' suits. If the courts are willing to entertain such suits, as even the
federal courts may now do, 8 the entire range of public interests should
be subject to judicial protection at the suit of concerned citizens.
If the plaintiff is a public official, his interest need not be personal,
and the question presented need not be financial in order for the court
to issue a declaratory judgment. It is sufficient that he is in doubt about
some aspect of his duty,8 7 or desires to advance the interests of the citi-
zens within his jurisdiction.'
From the jurisdictional point of view, the only inquiry should be
whether plaintiff has sufficient interest in the subject matter so that he
can present to the court his side of the controversy, i.e., the arguments
in favor of the legal interest which he seeks to protect. If he will in fact
be adversely affected financially, he has such an interest and is entitled
182. Seaboard Air Line R.R. v. Peters, 43 So.2d 448 (Fla. 1949); Dickinson v. Bell,
214 So.2d 24 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968). Contra, Burrows v. Hagerman, 159 Fla. 826, 33 So.2d
34 (1947); Grable v. Hillsborough County Port Auth., 132 So.2d 423 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1961).
183. Rosenhouse v. 1950 Spring Term Grand Jury, 56 So.2d 445 (Fla. 1952); City of
Coral Gables v. Sackett, 253 So.2d 890 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971); Pinellas County v. Town of
Belleair Shore, 180 So.2d 510 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965) ; Robinson's Inc. v. Short, 146 So.2d 108
(Fla. 1st Dist. 1962), cert. denied, 152 So.2d 170 (Fla. 1963); R.L. Bernardo & Sons, Inc. v.
Duncan, 134 So.2d 297 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1961), quashed, 145 So.2d 476 (Fla.), rev'd, 147
So.2d 542, (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962).
184. City of Miami v. Keton, 115 So.2d 547 (Fla. 1959) (whether city had to return
traffic fines); Safer v. City of Jacksonville, 212 So.2d 785 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968) (whether
city's housing code was arbitrary, constituted an illegal usurpation of legislative power, etc.).
185. Dade-Commonwealth Title Ins. Co. v. North Dade Bar Ass'n, 152 So.2d 723
(Fla. 1963); Askew v. Hold the Bulkhead-Save Our Bays, Inc., 269 So.2d 696 (Fla. 2d Dist.
1972); Linning v. Board of County Comm'rs, 176 So.2d 350 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965); Ashe v.
City of Boca Raton, 133 So.2d 122 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1961); Guernsey v. Haley, 107 So.2d 184
(Fla. 2d Dist. 1958). Contra, Ervin v. Collins, 85 So.2d 852 (Fla. 1956) (when attorney
general is plaintiff).
186. Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814 (1969); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
187. Reid v. Kirk, 257 So.2d 3 (Fla. 1972); Walker v. Pendarvis, 132 So.2d 186 (Fla.
1961); Overman v. State Bd. of Control, 62 So.2d 696 (Fla. 1952); State v. City of
Miami, 54 So.2d 250 (Fla. 1951); Cobb v. Board of County Comm'rs, 155 Fla. 60, 19 So.2d
505 (1944).
188. City of St. Petersburg v. Briley, Wild & Assoc., 239 So.2d 817 (Fla. 1970); Ervin
v. Collins, 85 So.2d 852 (Fla. 1956); Broward County v. Lerer, 203 So.2d 672 (Fla. 4th
Dist. 1967). Caldwell v. North, 157 Fla. 52, 24 So.2d 806 (1946).
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to standing, whether or not he is affected to a greater extent than other
members of the public.18 The same rule should apply if he will in fact
be adversely affected in some way, other than financial, even though he is
in the same position as other members of the public. Recent federal
cases have so held.1"0 If the public interest is to be vindicated, the
courts must refuse to adhere to an outworn rule which, in effect, states
that the more widespread the damage the defendant has done, the less
susceptible he is to judicial remedy. For example, when the question is
one involving the environment, the courts should recognize the standing
of plaintiffs without proof of their having suffered financial damage, since
plaintiffs will almost invariably be unable to show such damage, no mat-
ter how severe the harm to the habitability of the area. Statutory au-
thority for such citizen suits is increasing.' 9'
In 1971, Florida joined the parade by adopting a statute permitting
any citizen to bring suit for injunction to redress environmental wrongs,
after making appropriate demand on the public authorities charged with
enforcement of environmental laws. 12 When the legislature is willing to
permit the drastic remedy of injunction in such cases, then standing to
obtain a mere declaration should follow as a matter of course. Certainly
the courts should now recognize the obsolescence of the "taxpayer" test
and favor the "affected citizen" test in cases where the expanding role
of the government presses constantly harder on the individual, be he
rich or poor.
2. ADVERSE INTEREST OF DEFENDANT
It is clear that there can be no controversy without a defendant,0 1
and it is often said that the defendant must possess an existing adverse
interest.'0 However, there need not be an actual dispute before the
complaint can be filed, i.e., the defendant need not actually have asserted
his interest against the plaintiff. The mere existence of potentially ad-
verse interests is obviously sufficient in cases involving the validity or
construction of a statute, ordinance, contract, deed, will, franchise or
other article, memorandum or instrument in writing, since the Florida
189. See text at notes 182-85 supra.
190. See, e.g., Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 354 F.2d
608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966), cited with approval in Association of
Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 155 (1970).
191. E.g., Federal Clean Air Act, § 304, 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2 (1970); Michigan En-
vironmental Protection Act., MIcu CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 691.1201-.1207 (1970).
192. FLA. STAT. § 403.412(2) (1971).
193. Ervin v. Taylor, 66 So.2d 816 (Fla. 1953) (declaratory action must be dismissed
for failure to name party defendant).
194. Journeymen Local 234 v. Henley & Beckwith, Inc., 66 So.2d 818 (Fla. 1953);
Hialeah Racecourse v. Gulfstream Park Racing Ass'n, 210 So.2d 750 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968);
Sheppard v. Williams, 193 So.2d 191 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966); Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v.
Dade County, 100 So.2d 76 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1958).
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Declaratory Judgments Act itself specifies that in such cases it is suf-
ficient that plaintiff be "in doubt," 195 and the cases so hold.'9 The better
construction of the act is that "doubt" on each side is sufficient, and that
neither party need be actually hostile to the other. 9 Hositility is not
present in many suits by public officials and in other "friendly" suits,
and yet the courts' jurisdiction over them is undoubted. According to
Borchard,
[t]he mere fact that the defendant's interest is potentially ad-
verse justifies summoning him to defend; and the mere fact
that he admits his liability or consents to be sued or even, un-
der certain circumstances of so-called "friendly suits," that he
is interested in the same judgment as the plaintiff, is not neces-
sarily a bar to an ordinary executory action. . . .The court
must merely be alert to distinguish the fictitious or collusive
suits, where only information or opinion is sought, or where
the defendant appears as a lay figure only for the purpose of
obtaining jurisdiction, from those in which rights are placed in
issue with the purpose of a binding determination. 98
However, if the interests of the parties are identical from the beginning,
and are thus not even "potentially adverse," the case is not justiciable
and no declaratory decree can be entered, since the court would be acting
merely as a counselor and not deciding a controversy.'99
The courts are not always as careful of their language in this re-
spect as they should be. An example of a correct decision, but a mis-
leading formulation, is Colby v. Colby.200 That case involved a complaint
for the construction of a foreign divorce decree which was clear and
unambiguous. In the absence of reasonable doubt, the complaint was
properly dismissed. However, the court went on to say:
There must be a bona fide dispute between the adversaries as
to a present justiciable question .... The test to activate juris-
diction under the [Declaratory Judgments] [A]ct is whether
or not the moving party shows that he is in doubt as to the
existence or non-existence of some right, status, immunity,
power, or privilege.2°'
Thus, the court stated in successive sentences the erroneous requirement
195. FLA. STAT. § 86.021 (1971).
196. See text at notes 77-82 supra.
197. In the following cases, the opinions indicate that no actual hostility existed:
Riviere v. Orlando Parking Comm'n, 74 So.2d 694 (Fla. 1954); Bowden v. Carter, 65 So.2d
871 (Fla. 1953); Dickinson v. Buck, 220 So.2d 48 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969).
198. BORCHARD, supra note 2 at 38-39 (emphasis added).
199. Brautigam v. MacVicar, 73 So.2d 863 (Fla. 1954); Lassiter v. City of Miami
Beach, 239 So.2d 269 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
200. 120 So.2d 797 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1960).
201. Id. at 799 (emphasis added).
.202. See section IV infra.
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that a "dispute" must exist and the correct test that it is sufficient that
plaintiff be "in doubt."
In conclusion, therefore, the jurisdictional requirement of an ad-
versary proceeding should be, and usually has been, met where plaintiff
claims some immunity, power, privilege or right in which he has suf-
ficient interest so that he can adequately present it to the court for de-
cision, defendant represents a different position on the same subject
matter, which is an actual or potential threat to the plaintiff, and a
reasonable doubt exists as to which position is correct. The extent to
which the court will require the interest to be plaintiff's own, or will
allow him to represent a public interest in which his share is no greater
than that of many other citizens, properly depends on the court's dis-
cretion, which will be discussed hereafter. 0
D. Finality of the Judgment to be Rendered
In a very real sense, the "justiciable controversy" requirements pre-
viously discussed are only preliminary considerations to the ultimate
requirement that the issues presented be capable of final disposition by
the court. If the controversy is not "legal" in nature, either because the
issues are not susceptible of judicial resolution or because their resolution
has been committed by the constitution or statutes to another authority,
a court's judgment would be merely advisory to those having the true
power. If the controversy is not "ripe," because the facts are not yet
sufficiently developed or are regarded as too contingent, a judgment
might be subject to later modification when the facts are presented con-
cretely or the contingency is resolved. If the proceeding is not "adver-
sary" in character, because plaintiff has no standing or because defen-
dant's position is not such as to present real issues for resolution, a
judgment might not be binding when a later suit presents to the court a
true adversary proceeding.
The requirement that the court's judgment dispose of the legal and
factual issues presented is as compelling in a declaratory action as in a
coercive proceeding. The Supreme Court of Florida has clearly expressed
that "[e]xcept for the coercive element in the judgment or decree . . .
there is no difference between a declaratory judgment or decree and any
other judgment between opposing parties." 03 As one author has said, the
absence of coercive words indicates "not the disappearance but the per-
fection of the rule of force. '20 4 What the writer of these words meant is
that the more civilized a society is, the more binding it will consider the
judgment of a court acting within its jurisdiction, whether or not the
judgment is followed by coercive words and by execution. But what if
203. Sheldon v. Powell, 99 Fla. 782, 793, 128 So.2d 258, 263 (1930).
204. Sunderland, A Modern Evolution in Remedial Rights, The Declaratory Judgment,
16 MICH. L. REv. 69, 70 (1917).
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a party should defy the court's declaration? Is the court to stand help-
less in the face of his defiance? Of course notl The necessary implica-
tion from any declaratory judgment is that the power to coerce must be
standing in the background, ready to be summoned if needed. A court
exercising the power to declare must, ultimately possess the power to do
more than declare, otherwise its judgment is merely advisory and no
justiciable controversy exists.205
The Florida Declaratory Judgments Act itself recognizes that the
court issuing a declaration must possess the power to compel obedience
to the declaration, should such action become necessary.
Further relief based on a declaratory judgment may be granted
when necessary or proper. . . . If the application is sufficient,
the court shall require any adverse party whose rights have
been adjudicated by the declaratory judgment to show cause on
reasonable notice, why further relief should not be granted
forthwith.2 o"
Whether or not the court finds it necessary or proper to add "fur-
ther relief" to its declaration is, of course, immaterial so far as the bind-
ing effect of the declaration is concerned. If the declaration has been
issued by a court possessing jurisdiction of the subject matter and over
the parties, it is res judicata in any subsequent proceeding in any court.207
There is, however, an important distinction to be noted between the
scope of the ordinary action at law and the scope of the declaratory judg-
ment. This distinction arises from the fact that, in the action at law seek-
ing a coercive judgment, the court must grant the relief prayed for if the
complaint is legally sufficient, whereas in the declaratory action the court
has discretion to refuse the declaration if it will serve no useful pur-
pose.2°6 Thus, a dismissal with prejudice in a declaratory action may
mean no more than that the plaintiff is not entitled to declaratory relief
and, if so, he may seek relief in another form of action.209 On the other
hand, a judgment with prejudice in an ordinary action at law is con-
clusive, often even as to matters which could have been, but were not
litigated, and thus, bars further litigation.210
205. See Developments in the Law-Declaratory Judgments-1941-1949, 62 HARV. L.
Rav. 787, 788 (1949).
206. FLA. STAT. § 86.061 (1971). Examples of cases approving supplemental relief are:
South Dade Farms, Inc. v. Peters, 107 So.2d 30 (Fla. 1958); City of Miami Beach v. State,
242 So.2d 170 (Fla. 3d Dist.), cert. denied, 246 So.2d 573 (1971).
207. Garden Suburbs Golf & Country Club v. Murrell, 180 F.2d 435 (5th Cir. 1950)
(holding Florida declaratory decree construing lease res judicata in subsequent federal suit
to collect rent); Bartholf v. Bartholf, 108 So.2d 905 (Fla. 1959) (declaratory decree on
immunity from income tax allowed, although final adjudication must be in federal court);
Hillsborough County v. Twin Lakes Mobile Home Village, Inc., 166 So.2d 191 (Fla. 2d
Dist. 1963) (declaratory decree held res judicata) ; National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dotschay, 134
So.2d 248 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1961) (declaratory decree held res judicata).
208. See text at notes 215-17 infra.
209. North Shore Realty Corp. v. Gallaher, 99 So.2d 255 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1957).
210. The effect of the [declaratory] judgment, therefore, unlike a judgment for
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The court should, of course, restrict its declaration to "legal" is-
sues, and be careful not to intrude upon executive or administrative dis-
cretion. The court may therefore declare illegal executive or administra-
tive actions, but it should not direct the executive or administrative
agency as to the particular action to be taken unless affirmatively au-
thorized by statute to do so.2 '
The Florida courts have taken care, sometimes to an excessive ex-
tent, to limit their declarations to controversies well within the judicial
power, so that they can, if necessary, enforce their judgments by coercive
action. Such judicial restraint contrasts with some decisions of the United
States Supreme Court in recent years, declaring rights in the absence of
any present or future power to enforce the judgment.212 The resulting
problems presented to the lower federal courts have, in the words of one
of them, been such as to "boggle the mind."21 Either excess is to be
avoided, but caution is the lesser of the two evils. Refusing a declaration
that the court has power to grant may unjustifiably disappoint the in-
dividual parties. Granting a declaration that the court will not be able
to enforce in the face of a serious challenge may imperil respect for law
and, consequently, the foundation of the entire judicial system.
IV. JUDICIAL DISCRETION TO DECLINE
TO EXERCISE JURISDICTION
Although the plaintiff may have established the elements necessary
for a court's jurisdiction to grant a declaratory judgment, it does not
follow that he is entitled to maintain his suit. He must still convince the
court that it should exercise its discretion to render a declaration on the
case presented by his complaint.
The Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act expressly authorizes the
court to refuse to entertain a declaratory suit when its judgment or de-
cree "would not terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to
the payment of money, is not to merge a cause of action in the judgment or to bar
it. The effect of a declaratory judgment is rather to make res judicata the matters
declared by the judgment, thus precluding the parties to the litigation from relit-
igating these matters.
RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 77, comment b at 333-34 (1942). Thus, it is necessary to
determine what was actually declared even when there is a dismissal with prejudice. North
Shore Realty Corp. v. Gallaher, 99 So.2d 255, 256 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1957).
211. Green v. Taylor, 70 So.2d 502 (Fla. 1954); Varlas v. Meiklejohn, 206 So.2d 449
(Fla. 1st Dist. 1968); City of Miami Beach v. Klinger, 179 So.2d 884 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
212. Mitchell v. Donovan, 397 U.S. 982 (1970); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486
(1969); Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967).
213. Bradley v. School Bd., 462 F.2d 1058, 1068 (4th Cir. 1972).
Declaratory relief in this case is particularly inappropriate since it could not finally
terminate the controversy, indeed, it might well tend to resurrect the very conflict
our holding of inappropriateness seeks to avoid.
Powell v. MacCormack, 395 F.2d 577, 597 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (Burger, C.J.), rev'd, 395 U.S.
486 (1970). The Supreme Court seems to have returned recently to a clearer appreciation
of the practical limits of judicial power. See Ohio v. Wyandotte Chem. Corp., 401 U.S. 493
(1971); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
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the proceeding." '214 The Florida act omits this language. Nevertheless, it
is well settled in this state that the declaratory cause of action is equi-
table in nature, and that the court, as in other cases in equity, possesses
the discretionary power to dismiss the complaint where it would not be
equitable to grant relief to the plaintiff.215 The discretion conferred upon
the courts is not an arbitrary one, but is a sound judicial discretion sub-
ject to review for abuse. 16 Our inquiry therefore turns to an examination
of the circumstances which have influenced the courts in exercising their
discretion.
We may profitably begin by reminding ourselves that the Florida act,
like other declaratory judgment acts, was enacted primarily to afford
relief where a legal interest is threatened but cannot be protected by
existing remedies. Both the Uniform Act and the Florida act expressly
state that they are intended to be "remedial." According to the Uniform
Act, its purpose is "to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with
regard to rights, status and other legal relations; and is to be liberally
construed and administered." '217 The background and statutory language
of the acts indicate the criteria the courts should rely upon in exercising
their discretion. Since the Florida act was passed to protect interests
which were not otherwise adequately protected, the existence of a need
for such relief is a prerequisite to favorable exercise of the court's dis-
cretion. In addition, since the purpose of the act is "to afford relief from
insecurity and uncertainty," a declaration should not be issued, even
though a need for it exists, unless the declaration will "terminate the
uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceeding," to use the lan-
guage of the Uniform Act.218 Borchard has expressed these criteria in
the following language:
The two principal criteria guiding the policy in favor of render-
ing declaratory judgments are (1) when the judgment will serve
a useful purpose in clarifying and settling the legal relations in
issue, and (2) when it will terminate and afford relief from the
uncertainty, insecurity, and controversy giving rise to the pro-
ceeding. It follows that when neither of these results can be
214. UNIFORm DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS ACT § 6.
215. North Shore Bank v. Town of Surfside, 72 So.2d 659, 661-62 (Fla. 1954), Jollowed
in Bell v. Associated Independents, Inc., 143 So.2d 904 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962); Garner v.
Wood, 150 So.2d 493, 495 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963) (also relying on use of permissive word
"may" in FLA. STAT. § 86.011 (1971)). Jacksonville Roofing and Sheet Metal Contractors
Ass'n v. Sheet Metal Workers' Local 435, 156 So.2d 416, 418 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963).
216. "Yet the discretion granted, however wide and unlimited in appearance, is a judi-
cial discretion, hardened by experience into rule, and its exercise is subject to appellate re-
view." BORCHARD, supra note 2 at 293.
217. UN oRm DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS ACT § 12. The Florida section states that the
act "is declared to be substantive and remedial. Its purpose is to settle and to afford relief
from insecurity and uncertainty with respect to rights, status and other equitable or legal
relations and is to be liberally administered and construed." FLA. STAT. § 86.101 (1971)
(additions to the Uniform Act are italicized).
218. UNnrORM DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS ACT § 6.
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accomplished, the court should decline to render the declaration
prayed.21
9
We shall now consider the Florida cases dealing with the criteria
just mentioned.
A. Need for Declaratory Relief
Since the declaratory judgment acts arose out of the need for relief
where other remedies were either nonexistent or inadequate, it might
plausibly be asserted that, where there is another form of action which
will afford equally adequate relief, the court should exercise its discretion
to refuse a declaration. Nevertheless, the courts should be guided here
by the expressly contrary legislative intent. Unlike the Uniform Act, the
Florida act provides that "[tihe existence of another adequate remedy
does not preclude a judgment for declaratory relief." 2 ' Surely this lan-
guage, added to the model which was the basis for the Florida act, should
be given some reasonable effect. It is submitted that the combination of
the act's provision for liberal interpretation and its provision that an-
other adequate remedy does not preclude relief, must be construed to
require that the existence of an alternative remedy should preclude a
declaration only if the court finds that the alternative is more than "ade-
quate," i.e., that it is superior to declaratory relief under the facts of
or the law applicable to the case. Such an interpretation not only accords
with the intent and language of the act, but it also tends to minimize
the problems faced by the attorney who must choose the form of action
which will best protect his client, since it allows some margin for error
where the choice is evenly balanced. Many Florida decisions, either ex-
pressly or in their effect, support this interpretation.
Declarations have been refused in a number of cases because an-
other remedy was clearly more advantageous to the parties, more ad-
vantageous to the judicial process, or more in accordance with constitu-
tional or statutory principles. Thus, a suit praying for a declaration of
the parties' rights under a contract, which actually is nothing more than
an action to recover damages for alleged breach, should obviously be
brought at law with a prayer for damages; it will therefore be trans-
ferred from the equity to the law side of the court.221 Where another
219. BORCHARD, supra note 2 at 299 (emphasis added). Accord, May v. Holley, 59 So.2d
636 (Fla. 1952).
220. FLA. STAT. § 86.111 (1971). This clause has been relied upon to sustain a declara-
tory action when an action for an accounting and damages would have been equally ade-
quate, and the plaintiff did not need a guide to future action. Ennis v. Warm Mineral
Springs, Inc., 203 So.2d 514 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967). FED. R. Civ. P. 57 states: "The existence
of another adequate remedy does not preclude a judgment for declaratory relief in cases
where it is appropriate."
221. Barrett v. Pickard, 85 So.2d 630 (Fla. 1956) ; Deen v. Weaver, 47 So.2d 539 (Fla.
1950); Reddick v. Christie, 226 So.2d 434 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969); Joseph v. Board of Pub.
Instruc., 184 So.2d 452 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966); Broward Drug Stores, Inc. v. Perini Land &
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form of action, with more stringent requirements than the declaratory
action, specifically applies to the case, plaintiff will not be permitted to
evade those requirements by suing only for declaratory relief, but must
utilize the other form of action.22
In ejectment, the statutory cause of action permits not only an ad-
judication of the right to possession, but also a remedy for the net value
of the improvements added to the land in good faith by defendant, so
that all the rights of the parties can be settled in one suit. 2  Ejectment
is thus superior to a declaratory judgment, and must be used where
applicable. 24 If an administrative remedy is available, respect for the
administrative process requires that such remedy be exhausted before
any court suit, declaratory or otherwise, can be entertained. 25 Where
plaintiff seeks a declaration interpreting a contract, but the contract con-
tains provisions for the arbitration of such disputes, he will, of course,
be compelled to resort to arbitration.2 ' Finally, if another suit is pend-
ing by which plaintiff in the declaratory action can obtain complete relief,
the court will insist that he litigate his claims in the other action, whether
he be plaintiff227 or defendant 22 in that case.
Conversely, where plaintiff cannot obtain complete relief as a de-
fendant in another pending action, the court will declare his rights, even
if a criminal prosecution must be stayed.229 If the remedy in a future
action would be no more than adequate, a declaratory action may also be
maintained.280 Permitting a declaratory judgment on the equity side does
not deprive defendant of any right he might have to a trial by jury, since
the Florida act expressly preserves trial by jury in declaratory actions.23'
Dev. Co., 170 So.2d 86 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964). Under the Act of 1919, all declaratory actions
were in chancery, and, thus, the defendant was deprived of his right to trial by jury.
Lippman v. Shapiro, 151 Fla. 327, 9 So.2d 636 (1942).
222. Nohrr v. Brevard County Educ. Facilities Auth., 247 So.2d 304 (Fla. 1971) (bond
validation) ; Bessemer Properties, Inc. v. City of Opalocka, 74 So.2d 296 (Fla. 1954) (bond
validation).
223. FLA. STAT. §§ 66.011-.101 (1971).
224. Stark v. Marshall, 67 So.2d 235 (Fla. 1963); Cape Sable Corp. v. McClurg, 74
So.2d 883 (Fla. 1954); Bowden v. Seaboard Air Line R.R., 47 So.2d 786 (Fla. 1950).
225. Florida Hotel and Restaurant Comm'n v. Marseilles Hotel Co., 84 So.2d 567 (Fla.
1956); Mountain v. National Airlines, Inc., 75 So.2d 574 (Fla. 1954).
226. Jacksonville Roofing and Sheet Metal Contractors Ass'n v. Sheet Metal Workers'
Local 435, 156 So.2d 416 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963). An insurer's denial of coverage may con-
stitute a waiver of the right to arbitration. American So. Ins. Co. v. Daniel, 198 So.2d 850
(Fla. 1st Dist. 1967).
227. Taylor v. Cooper, 60 So.2d 534 (Fla. 1952).
228. Burns v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 157 So.2d 84 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963); McNair
v. Dade County, 127 So.2d 142 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1961).
229. Watson v. Centro Espanol de Tampa, 30 So.2d 288 (Fla. 1947).
230. Marconi v. Schimmel, 181 So.2d 167 (Fla..3d Dist. 1965) (declaration granted
lessee as to rights under renewal term of lease where otherwise marketability of lessee's
business would Be impaired).
231. FLA. STAT. § 86.071 (1971). In view of this section, refusal to transfer a case to
the law side was held harmless error in Caballero, Herdegen & Knight, Inc. v. Threlkeld, 142
So.2d 124 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962), and in Olins, Inc. v. Avis Rental Car Sys., 131 So.2d 20
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1961).
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Where plaintiff alleges a case for declaratory relief, he is entitled to a
declaration on the merits, although he might have proceeded in some
other adequate action, such as quo warranto,282 mandamus, 183 replevin, 214
or other suit at law or in equity.285 Public officials are given authority to
obtain declarations in order that they may determine whether to file a
criminal information, or to disburse public funds for a particular pur-
pose.28 ' Even if plaintiff does not allege a case for declaratory relief, but
his prayer is broad enough to include other relief, it has been held to be
error to dismiss the complaint, because the case should be retained for
consideration of the other relief.
2 8 7
There are, however, contrary decisions, refusing a declaration be-
cause of the existence of another remedy which was no more than ade-
quate. 28 Difficult to understand, or to reconcile with the statute and the
preceding authorities, are decisions approving dismissal of a complaint
for declaratory judgment because "injunction is more appropriate," 239
or where the parties were in dispute as to their rights under a contract.24 °
These cases appear to show a preference for the more traditional forms of
action, which is not explained in any of the opinions, and which is con-
trary to the liberal purpose of the Florida Declaratory Judgments Act.
Cases holding that the existence of another merely adequate remedy
precludes declaratory judgment have been subjected to a searching crit-
ical analysis by Borchard. He points out that, even in the absence of
language such as that contained in the Florida act,241 the decisions are
wrong because they disregard the history and purpose of the declaratory
remedy, disregard the language of the statutes, conflict with the great
majority of the decisions granting relief in such cases, compel a plaintiff
232. Shelly v. Brewer, 68 So.2d 573 (Fla. 1953); Lockleer v. City of W. Palm Beach,
51 So.2d 291 (Fla. 1951); Town of Daytona Beach Shores v. Foster, 135 So.2d 903 (Fla.
1st Dist. 1962).
233. Mayes Printing Co. v. Flowers, 154 So.2d 859 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963); Fisher v.
Dade County, 127 So.2d 132 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1961).
234. Title & Trust Co. v. Title Guar. & Abstract Co., 103 So.2d 211 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1958).
235. Miller v. Doss, 160 Fla. 660, 36 So.2d 442 (1948); Kingdon v. Walker, 156 So.2d
208 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
236. Jacksonville Expressway Auth. v. Duval County, 189 So.2d 837 (Fla. 1st Dist.
1966) (controversy between couynty and state agency over disbursement); Rachleff v.
Mahon, 124 So.2d 878 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1960) (to determine whether magazines were obscene).
237. Middleton v. Plantation Homes, Inc., 71 So.2d 503 (Fla. 1954). Of course, the
complaint is properly dismissed with prejudice where it is clear that the facts do not en-
title plaintiff to any relief, declaratory or otherwise. Silvers v. Drake, 188 So.2d 377 (Fla.
1st Dist. 1966).
238. This category must include the numerous cases refusing to try issues of "fact" in
declaratory actions. See discussion in text at notes 245 to 280 infra. In none of these cases
was the other remedy more than adequate, and in some cases there was none.
239. Garner v. DeSoto Ranch, Inc., 150 So.2d 493 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
240. Smith v. Jacksonville Terminal Employees Fed. Credit Union, 193*So.2d 436 (Fla.
1st Dist. 1967); Lyons v. Capi, 188 So.2d 909 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1966); M & E Land Co. v.
Siegal, 177 So.2d 769 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965).
241. "The existence of another adequate remedy does not preclude a judgment for
declaratory relief." FLA. STAT. § 68.111 (1971).
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to use a drastic remedy when he prefers a milder one, and disregard the
rule that under modern practice the court should entertain a complaint
if the facts pleaded show that plaintiff is entitled to relief under any
theory.242 Decisions throwing such procedural roadblocks in a plaintiff's
way, where his complaint shows that he is entitled to some relief, need-
lessly confuse the law and increase the cost of litigation.
B. Termination of the Uncertainty or Controversy
In spite of the absence of specific language on this point in the
Florida act, it is clear that a court should not entertain a declaratory
action where its judgment or decree "would not terminate the uncertainty
or controversy giving rise to the proceeding.1 24 In fact, there is substan-
tial doubt as to a court's jurisdiction in such cases, since, as was pointed
out in the previous section, ability to enter a judgment or decree finally
disposing of the issues presented is one of the elements of a "contro-
versy" necessary to invoke the "judicial power" of the court. Conversely,
if the court can terminate the controversy by its judgment, then it should
hear the case, provided the other appropriate elements affecting jurisdic-
tion and discretion are favorable to such a result.
The conclusion just stated appears equally sound whether the case
turns on a determination of "fact" or a determination of "law." Plaintiff's
need for the remedy may be equally great whether defendant's threat to
his position arises from a dispute as to "fact" (what occurred) or a dis-
pute as to "law" (the legal consequences of what occurred). Issues of
fact and of law are ordinarily inseparable parts of plaintiff's cause of
action. In addition, all of defendant's substantive and procedural rights
are fully preserved in the declaratory proceeding. It serves no useful pur-
pose to tell a plaintiff that he may have a declaratory remedy if defend-
ant chooses to litigate his issues of law, but that if defendant chooses to
litigate his issues of fact, even frivolously or without good faith, he may
not have a declaratory remedy and may often have no remedy at all.
Finally, refusal to issue declarations where questions of fact are involved
is contrary to the legislative intent manifested by the provision of the act
that the court "may render declaratory judgments on the existence, or
nonexistance ... [o]f any fact upon which 'the existence or nonexist-
ence of any such immunity, power, privilege or right" may depend.
24
There are many examples, both in Florida and elsewhere, of declara-
tory judgments rendered in cases where the decisive issues were issues of
fact. The landmark case of Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Haworth,245
which sustained the Federal Declaratory Judgments Act, itself turned
242. BORC ARD, supra note 2 at 315-46.
243. UNIFORM DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS ACT § 6.
244. FLA. STAT. § 86.011 (1971) (emphasis added).
245. 300 U.S. 227 (1937).
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on the factual issue of whether Haworth was totally and permanently
disabled. The Florida courts have frequently issued declarations resolv-
ing factual issues, often without finding it necessary to discuss their right
to do so. For example, declarations have been granted as to whether the
facts showed a sufficient change of circumstances to make it inequitable
to enforce a restrictive covenant;246 whether the evidence showed that a
contract had been made orally;.4 what the terms of a disputed oral
agreement were; 24 8 whether defendant had used its "best efforts" to pro-
duce percentage rent, as required by a lease; 249 and whether the facts
were sufficient to require one party to a contract rather than the other to
bear a hurricane loss.50 They have also been rendered as to whether a
contractor had done defective work; 251 whether the proof was sufficient
to show that a contract or lease had been terminated; 25 2 whether the
testimony proved defendant guilty of fraud;213 whether the evidence
showed compliance with the law in the preparation of a tax roll 24
whether defendant was guilty of failure to comply with the terms of a
former decree; 255 what the surrounding circumstances showed as to de-
cedent's intention in making a will or a gift; 256 and resolving factual
disputes in many other cases.257
246. Sinclair Refining Co. v. Watson, 65 So.2d 732 (Fla.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 872
(1953). Cases from other jurisdictions to the same effect are collected in Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d
1111, 1126, 1137 (1949).
247. Storer v. Florida Sportservice, Inc., 115 So.2d 433 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1959), second
appeal, 125 So.2d 906 (3d Dist. 1961).
248. Simpson v. Ivey, 67 So.2d 687 (Fla. 1953); Goldberg v. Michalik, 237 So.2d 298
(Fla. 2d Dist. 1970); Price v. Rome, 222 So.2d 252 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969); Hewitt v. Price,
222 So.2d 247 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969); Barrineau v. B & F Auto Parts, Inc., 191 So.2d 53
(Fla. 1st Dist. 1966).
249. Mayfair Operating Corp. v. Bessemer Properties, Inc., 150 Fla. 132, 7 So.2d 342
(1942).
250. Triple E. Dev. Co. v. Floridagold Citrus Corp., 51 So.2d 435 (Fla. 1951); Florida
Power Corp. v. City of Tallahassee, 154 Fla. 638, 18 So.2d 671 (1944).
251. Board of Pub. Instruc. v. Bradford Builders, 81 So.2d 496 (Fla. 1955).
252. Kanter v. Safran, 68 So.2d 553 (Fla. 1953); Koretsky v. Singer, 159 Fla. 501, 32
So.2d 5 (1947); Bal Harbour Towers, Inc. v. Keller, 227 So.2d 219 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969);
Rodgers v. Kajax Realty Co., 165 So.2d 259 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964).
253. J.S. Michael Co. v. Rayonier, Inc., 212 So.2d 824 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968); Gormley
v. Gormley, 187 So.2d 676 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966); Rice v. Fremow, 165 So.2d 447 (Fla. 2d
Dist. 1964).
254. Townsend v. Gray, 181 So.2d 612 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966); R.H. James, Inc. v.
Anderson, 165 So.2d 829 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
255. Fleming v. State Rd. Dept., 157 Fla. 164, 25 So.2d 376 (1946).
256. Lungu v. Walters, 198 So.2d 99 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967); Pancoast v. Pancoast, 97
So.2d 875 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1957).
257. Bloomfield v. City of St. Petersburg Beach, 82 So.2d 364 (Fla. 1955) (whether
plaintiff had changed his domicile) ; Southern Food Stores v. Palm Groceries, 134 Fla. 838,
184 So. 502 (1938) (right to credit on debt) ; Pinellas County v. Dynamic Investments, Inc.,
279 So.2d 97 (Fla. 3rd Dist. 1973) (whether facts sustained zoning restrictions); City of
Miami Beach v. Fein, 263 So.2d 258 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972) (whether parties had agreed to
novation); Caswell v. Nethery, 258 So.2d 846 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1972) (whether conveyance
was absolute or for security); Goodman v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 240 So.2d 496 (Fla. 3d
Dist. 1970) (whether employee had voluntarily terminated employment) ; Davidson v. Miami
Beach First Nat'l Bank, 215 So.2d 623 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968) (whether price was inadequate) ;
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In the light of these decisions, it is astonishing to find Florida
courts asserting in other cases that a declaratory judgment may not
be used to resolve issues of "fact" alone.258 In some of those cases there
were other adequate reasons for declining to exercise jurisdiction. Where
only factual issues were presented and only money damages were de-
manded, but plaintiff filed a declaratory action in chancery, the courts
have properly transferred the case to the law side of the court in order
to preserve defendant's right to trial by jury." 9 Unfortunately, how-
ever, the language in those opinions has subsequently been interpreted
as forbidding any declaratory action raising only "fact" issues, and
requiring dismissal rather than transfer of such an action.26 ° Such de-
cisions completely lose sight of the fact that declaratory actions may be
filed either at law or in chancery. If a declaratory action raising only
legal issues which could be presented in another form of action is mis-
takenly filed in chancery, the defendant's rights are more fully protected
by transfer to the law side, rather than by dismissal. The law court can
then determine whether the action may proceed under the original
declaratory complaint, or whether an amended complaint should be
filed.
The anomalous insistence on dismissing declaratory actions raising
only issues of "fact" reaches its most unjustifiable extreme in the in-
surance decisions, where need for the declaratory remedy is often mani-
fest. The erroneousness of this position is apparent from the opinion
which laid down the rule in Columbia Casualty Co. v. Zimmerman.2 11
In that case, two automobile liability insurers were in dispute as to
which should defend a number of claims arising out of a single accident.
The dispute turned on whether a car was being driven with the consent
of defendant's insured; if so, it was obligated to defend. Plaintiff assumed
the defense of the damage suits, and, while these were still pending, filed
a declaratory complaint alleging the pendency of these suits and the
probability of others being filed, and asking the court to resolve the
issue of consent. The majority opinion of the Supreme Court of Florida
held that, in order for jurisdiction to exist under the declaratory judgment
statute, there must be
Singer v. Tobin, 201 So.2d 799 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967) (whether facts established equitable
lien) ; Breuil v. Hobbs, 166 So.2d 825 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964) (whether manufacturer could use
certain boat designs) ; Tulip Realty Co. v. Fuhrer, 155 So.2d 637 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963)
(whether landlord had unreasonably withheld his consent to assignment of lease); Glassman
v. Roney, 101 So.2d 25 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1958) (whether appraisal method was reasonable).
258. See notes 261-80 infra and accompanying text.
259. Barrett v. Pickard, 85 So.2d 630 (Fla. 1956) ; Halpert v. Oleksy, 65 So.2d 762 (Fla.
1953); Coral Gates Properties, Inc. v. Hodes, 59 So.2d 630 (Fla. 1952).
260. Florida Nat'l Bank v. Pugh, 88 So.2d 284 (Fla. 1956); M & E Land Co. v. Siegel,
177 So.2d 769 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965); Broward Drug Stores, Inc. v. Perini Land & Dev. Co.,
170 So.2d 86 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964). Contra, Lincoln Tower Corp. v. Dunhall's-Florida, 61
So.2d 474 (Fla. 1952) (legal issues of fact within the province of the equity court do not
authorize dismissal of a declaratory action).
261. 62 So.2d 338 (Fla. 1952) [hereinafter cited as Columbia Casualty].
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some doubt as to the proper interpretation of the written con-
tract or as to the existence or nonexistence of some right, status,
immunity, power or privilege under the written contract, and
that a construction thereof is necessary in order to determine
the rights [of the plaintiff] .262
The court then concluded that, since there was no doubt as to the
meaning of the insurance contract, but only as to the existence vel non
of the insured's consent, dismissal of the complaint would be affirmed.
Mr. Justice Terrell filed a strong dissent, in which he pointed out that a
declaration would avoid a multiplicity of suits by determining defend-
ant's obligation once and for all, and that there was no warrant in the
statute itself, or in decisions from other jurisdictions under similar
statutes, for the conclusion that the act did not cover the case.203 It might
be added that the insured, as well as the companies, would have benefited
from a declaratory judgment, which would have imposed on one company
or the other the duty to defend the suits and ended plaintiff company's
defense under reservation of right.
Notwithstanding the wholly inadequate basis for the decision in
Columbia Casualty, it has been followed in many subsequent cases,
which hold that no declaration will be granted either to an insured or
an insurer where coverage turns on a question of fact,264 but that the
court will declare rights when the facts are undisputed and only the
interpretation of the contract is in issue.265 None of the majority opinions
in those cases examined the basis of the alleged rule. However, the
dissenting judge in a recent case protested against it, pointing out that
the statute authorizes declarations on issues of fact, and that the com-
plaint before the court actually presented both issues of fact and issues
of construction.266
The decisions in the above cases are not based on any real difficulty
262. Id. at 340.
263. Id.
264. Bergh v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 216 So.2d 436 (Fla. 1968); New Amsterdam
Cas. Co. v. Intercity Supply Corp., 212 So.2d 110 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968); National Sur.
Corp. v. White Constr. Co., 206 So.2d 220 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968); Central Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Espina, 208 So.2d 144 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968) ; Swain v. Reliable Ins. Co., 200 So.2d 862 (Fla.
3d Dist. 1967); Smith v. Milwaukee Ins. Co., 197 So.2d 548 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1967) ; Hartford
Life Ins. Co. v. Albert, 191 So.2d 579 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966); Johnson v. Travelers Indem.
Co., 191 So.2d 61 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966) ; State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Couch, 167 So.2d
786 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964); American Indem. Co. v. Southern Credit Accep., Inc., 147 So.2d
10 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
265. Tuggle v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 207 So.2d 674 (Fla. 1968); Perez v.
State Auto. Ins. Ass'n, 270 So.2d 377 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972); Jones v. New Amsterdam Cas.
Co., 213 So.2d 502 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968); Millers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. American Fid. Fire
Ins. Co., 178 So.2d 742 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965); Ramirez v. Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins.
Co., 170 So.2d 317 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964), cert. denied, 177 So.2d 13 (Fla. 1965); Crown Life
Ins. Co. v. Luzarraga y Garay, 141 So.2d 633 (Fla. 3d Dist.), cert. denied, 143 So.2d 492
(Fla. 1962) ; Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada v. Klawans, 137 So.2d 230 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962),
quashed, 165 So.2d 166 (Fla.), conjormed to, 162 So.2d 702 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
266. New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Intercity Supply Corp., 212 So.2d 110, 114 (Fla. 4th
Dist. 1968) (Reid, J., dissenting).
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in trying factual issues in declaratory actions. This is made clear by a
number of decisions permitting a declaratory judgment in insurance
cases, even when the result depended on issues of fact, 67 and other
decisions approving a decree to declare rights and reform the insurance
policy on the basis of parol representations to the insured.268 One
opinion undertook to draw a distinction between those cases involving
"a factual situation arising subsequent to the issuance of the policy and
a factual dispute between a third party and the insured," which, it said,
are not subject to declaratory judgment, and the case before the court,
involving "a factual dispute between the insured and the company rela-
tive to a term of the policy," which was held to be subject to declaratory
judgment.2 69 The supposed distinction destroys the basis of the rule
which it undertakes to preserve. If a declaratory action is inappropriate
for the trial of "facts," what difference can it make which parties are
involved? Surely an "issue of fact" is still an "issue of fact," whether it
arises between the insurer and a third party or between the insurer and
insured.
The truth is that the "fact-law" distinction is impossible to apply
consistently, as is demonstrated by the conflicting Florida cases. This is
so for at least two reasons. In the first place, the courts have never been
able to evolve a satisfactory distinction between the two. One might sup-
pose that, where there was no dispute as to what occurred, and the only
question was whether the insurer's delay in disclaiming coverage consti-
tuted a waiver of its right to do so, a question of "law" was presented.
However, the Supreme Court of Florida has held such a question to be
one of "fact," and directed dismissal of a declaratory action even though
no party had raised the point. 7° Second, even if the distinction could be
made, it is often impossible to determine at the threshold of the case
whether it will ultimately turn on a question of "law" or of "fact.Y
271
Thus, the court must often hold a hearing in order to decide whether
267. National Auto Ins. Ass'n v. Brumit, 162 So.2d 330 (Fla. 1957); Massachusetts
Cas. Ins. Co. v. Johansen, 270 So.2d 397 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972); Florida Gas Co. v. Amer-
ican Employers' Ins. Co., 218 So.2d 197 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969); Jones v. New Amster-
dam Cas. Co., 213 So.2d 502 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968); Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Shelby
Mut. Ins. Co., 208 So.2d 465 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Home Ins.
Co., 194 So.2d 37 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967); Rosen v. Millers Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 193 So.2d 632
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1967); Green v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 181 So.2d 198 (Fla. 3d
Dist. 1966); Levinson v. Motor Union (Aviation) Orion Ins. Co., 176 So.2d 125 (Fla. 3d
Dist. 1965); Zeagler v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 166 So.2d 616 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964),
cert. discharged, 172 So.2d 450 (Fla. 1965) ; Cruger v. Allstate Ins. Co., 162 So.2d 690 (Fla.
3d Dist. 1964).
268. Hanover Ins. Co. v. Publix Market, Inc., 198 So.2d 346 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1967);
Coastal States Life Ins. Co. v. Raphael, 183 So.2d 274 (Fla. 3d Dist.), cert. denied, 192 So.2d
494 (Fla. 1966). Contra, Danson v. George Washington Life Ins. Co., 237 So.2d 774 (Fla.
1st Dist. 1970).
269. Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. B & B Chem. Co., 179- So.2d 125 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
270. Bergh v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 216 So.2d 436 (Fla. 1969).
271. Syndicate Gramercy, Inc. v. Daoud, 43 So.2d 334 (Fla. 1949) (distinction between
"fact" and "law" depended on which party's theory of the case was accepted).
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jurisdiction should be exercised. In the Bergh case, jurisdiction was not
denied until after both a trial on the merits and the decision of the case
on appeal, since the supreme court permitted an insured, who had con-
sented to a trial on the merits and lost, to raise the factual objection to
jurisdiction for the first time on appeal.272
Thus, the "rule" that issues of fact will not be tried in declaratory
cases has lost even the virtue of simplicity in error. The present state of
the law seems to be that sometimes the circuit courts will be permitted
to try declaratory actions turning on issues of fact, and sometimes they
will not, and a plaintiff cannot be sure in which category his case falls
until after the merits are litigated and reviewed by a court on appeal.
The decisions of the Florida courts denying declaratory judgments
in "fact" cases were anticipated and refuted by Borchard more than a
decade before the first of these decisions was rendered. In several pas-
sages dealing with this subject, he pointed out the need for such declara-
tions in many situations, and their particular usefulness in insurance
cases. This is so, he suggested, because of the following factors: in most
jurisdictions the issue of coverage or lack 9 f coverage could not be raised
in a third party's suit against the insured; the saving of time and expense
to both insured and insurer when coverage could be determined in ad-
vance of litigation on the claims; the large number of jurisdictions in
which declarations had been granted in such cases; and the errors of
reasoning in the few opinions refusing to grant declarations on questions
of fact.27 The other leading author on declaratory judgments concurs,
saying that denial of declarations in "fact" cases is an "unreasonable
conclusion," and that "the modern rule . . . is that the courts in declara-
tory judgment actions will as readily determine questions of fact as in
any other actions or proceedings that may come before them. 2
7 4
Some post hoc justification for the Florida decisions refusing decla-
rations concerning insurance coverage in the "fact" cases might be de-
rived from the recent decisions allowing an insurance company to be
named as party defendant along with the insured in a tort suit brought
by a claimant, 275 and permitting a separate trial on the issue of coverage
before trial of the tort claim.2 76 It might be argued that, even if there
was a need for the declaratory suit in such situations in the past, that
need has been reduced or eliminated by the insurer's right to a "cover-
272. Three justices dissented on this point. Bergh v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 216
So.2d 436, 442 (Fla. 1969). The dissent seems correct, since the question was not one of
subject matter jurisdiction, but merely whether the complaint stated a cause of action. See
Florida Gas Co. v. American Employers' Ins. Co., 218 So.2d 197 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
273. BORCHARD, supra note 2 at 309-12, 391-98, 645-55.
274. ANDERSON, supra note 87 at 987-88.
275. Shingleton v. Bussey, 223 So.2d 713 (Fla. 1969), overruling Artille v. Davidson,
126 Fla. 219, 170 So. 707 (1936), and holding that insurer may be joined in tort action
under automobile policy; Beta Eta House Corp. v. Gregory, 237 So.2d 163 (Fla. 1970)
(holding that insurer may be joined in tort action under other forms of liability insurance).
276. Stecher v. Pomeroy, 253 So.2d 421 (Fla. 1971); Beta Eta House Corp. v. Gregory,
237 So.2d 163 (Fla. 1970). -
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age" hearing in a tort action. It is submitted that such an explanation
is inadequate. One of the primary purposes of the declaratory action is
to enable a party to establish nonliability without waiting until the claim-
ant chooses to sue him, which latter suit may not occur until long after
witnesses have been lost and the facts have been obscured. The insur-
ance company may be particularly in need of such a right, since the facts
on which it relies are often in the control of an insured who is hostile
to a defense of noncoverage. The insured may also need to know where
he stands, as a guide to his future action in making an investigation or
negotiating settlement if he is not covered. Many declaratory actions
have in fact been brought by the insured party. Nevertheless, it must
be conceded that both insurer and insured now have a means other than
a declaratory suit to determine coverage before they must actually stand
trial on the tort claim, and that normally the tort claimant will bring
suit promptly. In both respects they are better off than potential defen-
dants in other "fact" cases, who can only stand and wait.
It may be that the Florida courts have refused relief in "fact" cases
because they feared harassment of insured parties by frivolous actions
for declarations of noncoverage which would subject them to great ex-
pense. If that is the reason, it should be brought out into the open, and
a decision should be rendered on the merits of each case, rather than
denying all declaratory relief in such cases even when they are meri-
torious. The courts have ample discretionary power to prevent the use
of declaratory proceedings for harassment. Borchard has pointed this
out:
The distinction between jurisdiction over the case and the pro-
priety of exercising that jurisdiction must be borne in mind.
The court should exercise its jurisdiction where it will serve a
useful social purpose, and especially where it will terminate the
controversy or settle the uncertainty giving rise thereto. The
exoneration of the insurance company would be in many cases
an adequate ground for the exercise of the jurisdiction.277
A circuit court can determine at a pretrial conference whether the
insurer has a real need for the declaration,278 and may exercise its dis-
cretion at that time to dismiss any declaratory action not brought in
good faith and for a desirable purpose. If the insurer's suit is dismissed,
an award of attorney's fees in favor of the insured should follow as a
matter of course. 9
For the following reasons, the present seems a particularly appro-
priate time for the Supreme Court of Florida to reexamine declaratory
actions turning on questions of "fact."
(a) The insurance cases are now distinguishable from other "fact"
277. BORCEOD, supra note 2 at 313.
278. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.200.
279. FLA. STAT. § 627.428 (1971).
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cases. Since 1969, insured and insurer can obtain what is essentially a
declaratory judgment on coverage by preliminary hearing in a tort suit
brought by the claimant. Their need for a separate declaratory action is
thus less than that of other plaintiffs in such cases, who may be totally
without adequate remedy if a declaratory suit is denied. The court can
thus, if it sees fit, modify the decisions purporting to lay down a rule of
law against "fact" cases without disturbing the insurance category.
(b) Refusal to permit declarations in "fact" cases not involving
insurance is clearly unjustifiable. The alleged rule is contrary to the
terms of the Florida Declaratory Judgments Act; is disregarded in nu-
merous Florida cases; is unfair to the plaintiff who has need of a decla-
ration, but is so unfortunate as to have issues of "fact" predominate in
his case; is not justified by any explanation in the opinions of the courts;
is impossible to apply consistently, because of the difficulty of drawing
the "fact-law" distinction; and is time-wasting and expensive for both
the courts and the parties, because of the frequent necessity of trial
court hearings and even appeals to determine in which category a given
case will fall. When we add to the above objections the recent willing-
ness of the supreme court to reverse and remand for dismissal on this
point, even though the question was never raised below,280 there is evi-
dent an exaltation of procedural snares over substantial justice that is
difficult to explain or defend.
In concluding the discussion of judicial discretion, it is submitted
that, in accordance with the remedial purpose of the Florida Declaratory
Judgments Act, a complaint pleading a declaratory cause of action within
the court's jurisdiction should be entertained unless the court finds that
(1) there is no need for declaratory relief, because there is another rem-
edy available which is exclusive or superior to the declaratory action;
or (2) the case pleaded does not present a bona fide controversy which
will finally dispose of a separable issue of fact or law; or (3) for some
other reason, based on the circumstances of the particular case, the ad-
vantages of the declaratory action are outweighed by the disadvantages.
In a proceeding that is equitable in origin, arbitrary classifications by
subject matter, whether "fact-law" or otherwise, should never be deci-
sive in the exercise of the court's discretion.
V. CONCLUSION
The road charted by the Florida Declaratory Judgments Act is
clear. If a plaintiff alleges a case within the coverage of the act and a
need for the relief, and if the court can ascertain that a declaration of
law or fact would terminate the uncertainty giving rise to the proceed-
ing, he has a prima facie right to a declaratory judgment or decree.
The court should refuse to entertain the proceeding only if it can deter-
280. See notes 271-73 supra.
1972] DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 93
mine that, in the circumstances of the particular case, the advantages
of the declaratory action are outweighed by the disadvantages.
The Florida courts can follow this road without serious difficulty
if they will, in all cases, observe the legislative mandate that the act is
"substantive and remedial," and that it is to be "liberally administered
and construed" for the purpose of affording "relief from insecurity and
uncertainty" in "equitable and legal relations." '' Their occasional fail-
ures to follow this directive are the basis of the criticisms contained in
this article. The present is an unusually appropriate time for the courts
to conform their decisions to the original beneficial purpose of the act.
281. FLA. STAT. § 86.101 (1971).
